A330 A340

FCTM Presentation 1.10.1 General O.I. (30 JUL 04) MODEL NUMBERS The aircraft models listed in the table below are covered in this Flight Crew Training Manual.
smartcockpit.com/data/pdfs/plane/airbus/a340/misc/a330-a340_flight_crew_training_manual.pdf

 

 DOWNLOAD | Find Similar

 


advertisement

 

 

 

Text Previews (text result may be not accurate)

10.80.1 Thetouchandgoisprimarilyemployedduringapproachandlandingpractice.It CarryoutavisualcircuitasdescribedinFCTMCh6.Confirmthatthespoilers Thetraineeaccomplishesanormalfinalapproachandlanding.Aftertouchdown, theinstructorselectsFlaps2,directsthetraineeto"standthemup",ensures ° UP Thisnormallyoccurs5secondsafterthepitchattitudeislessthan2.5 andifthe FCTM Reverse side blank INTENTIONALLY BLANK Training Guide IftherequiredDTGislessthanthatshownontheMCDU(lowonprofile),use IftherequiredDTGismorethanthatshownontheMCDU(highonprofile),use FCTM 10.70.1 IftheF-PLNweretobefollowedfromTODtotouchdown,thedescentprofile wouldbemanagedbytheFMGS.However,ATCrequirementsorweather avoidancemaytaketheaircraftofftheidealprofile.Consequently,itisimportant tobeawareoftheaircraft'spositionrelativetotheidealdescentprofileandthe timeavailableforanycorrectionstotakeeffect.Itisrelativelyeasyfortheaircraft tocorrectfrombeing3000ftaboveprofileatFL350,whereasbeing3000ft FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 10.60.3 SPEEDALT (G) SPEEDG/S* (G)LOC (G)CAT 3 GA TRK (G)AP1+2 (W) FCTM Reverse side blank Training Guide SPEEDALT* (G)NAV (G)AP1 (W) SPEEDALT (G)NAV (G)AP1 (W) MACHALT CRZNAVAP1 (W) THR IDLEDES (G) NAVAP1 (W) FCTM 10.60.1 AllchangesontheFMAaretobecalledbythePF,except"LANDGREEN" whichiscalledbythePNFonAUTOLANDapproaches.Ifanychangehasnot NAV (G)AP1 (W) THR CLBOP CLB (G) HDG (G)AP1 (W) FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 10.50.5 VFENEXTisthemaximumspeedforthenextflapleverselection(further V1isthehighestspeed,duringtake-off,atwhichthereisachoiceofeither continuingthetake-offorstoppingtheaircraft.Itisrepresentedby"1"onthe VRisthespeedatwhichthepilotrotatesinordertoreachV2ataheightof35ft abovetheendoftherunwaywithoneengineinoperative.Itisinsertedmanually FCTM Training Guide VMAXisthemaximumpermittedspeed,representedbythebottomofthered FCTM 10.50.3 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) S Speed · Add 1 kt per 1000 ft above 20000 ft · Subtract 10 kt with one engine out. TheprotectionspeedsV PROT,V MAX,VSWdisplayedonthePFDspeed PROTisthespeedthatcorrespondstotheangleofattackatwhichtheAOA protectionbecomesactive.Innormallawitisrepresentedbythetopofablack FLOORisthespeedthatcorrespondstotheangleofattackatwhichthe A/THRtriggersTOGAthrust.ThisvalueisnotdisplayedonthePFD,butis FCTM Training Guide VSisthestallingspeedandisnotdisplayed.Forconventionalaircraft,the referencestallspeed,VSmin,isbasedonaloadfactorthatislessthan1g.This givesastallspeedthatislowerthanthestallspeedat1g.Alloperatingspeeds areexpressedasfunctionsofthisspeed,e.g.VREF=1.3xVSmin.Because Airbusaircrafthavealowspeedprotectionfeaturewhichthecrewcannot override,theairworthinessauthoritieshavereconsideredthedefinitionofstall Alltheoperatingspeedsmustbereferencedtoaspeedthatcanbe demonstratedbyflighttest.ThisspeedisdesignatedasVS1g.Airworthiness FCTM 10.50.1 ThecharacteristicsspeedsVLS,F,SandGreenDotaredisplayedonthePFD VLS,F,SandGreenDotarealsodisplayedonthePERFTAKEOFF,APPR andGO-AROUNDpages.Thespeedsdisplayedonthesepagesarecomputed ComputationsmadebytheFEandtheFMGCarebasedonthegrossweight FCTM Training Guide Sidestick FCTM 10.40.1 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) SIDESTICK CHARACTERISTICS FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 10.30.7 Elato1AarrivaltoILS07L,chart11-1,checkaltitudeof1300ftat4.0 FCTM Reverse side blank Training Guide Weatheravoidancewillberequiredondeparturewithpossiblewindshear (discusswindshearactions).Cabincrewwillnotbereleasedtillclearof FCTM 10.30.5 O.I. (30 JUL 04) Operational Consider the following: · FCTM Training Guide AreaChartwithemphasisonnavigationaidstobeusedtoenhanceterrain FCTM 10.30.3 DepartureArrival Runway Name of SID / Departure Transition Name of STAR/Transition Approach Chart ID Type of Approach/Runway Final profile altitude check Minimums Missed Approach. Initial actions only i.e. Tracking and Altitude Navigation Aids for approach and go-around Relevant Sector MSA and highest MSA Relevant weather Relevant Operational Considerations Alternate Relevant Fuel FCTM Training Guide The" FCTM 10.30.1 O.I. (30 JUL 04) BRIEFING PROCEDURE FCTM Training Guide TheCommanderisresponsibleforensuringthattheaircraftisineverywayfitfor theintendedflight.TheMELrepresentsguidancetotheCommanderastowhat defectiveitemsmightbereasonablyleftunrectified,withoutjeopardizingthe FCTM 10.20.1 TheMasterMinimumEquipmentList(MMEL)ispublishedbytheaircraft manufacturerandisacertifieddocument.Itallowsanaircrafttobedispatched withsomeequipmentorsomefunctionsinoperative.Somelimitations, operationalproceduresand/ormaintenanceproceduresmayhavetobecarried out.TheMinimumEquipmentList(MEL)ispublishedbyCXandapprovedby theCAD.ItisnecessarilyatleastasrestrictiveastheMMEL.TheMMELcannot Thedispatchofanaircraftispossiblewithsomesecondaryairframepartorparts missing.Insuchacase,refertotheConfigurationDeviationList(CDL)atthe Eachitem/equipmentlistedintheMELisidentifiedusingATA(AirTransport Association)format.Itistheofficialreferencefortheclassificationoftheaircraft systemsand/orfunctions.Thisisachievedusingsixdigits.Forexample FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 10.10.1 Chapter10providesadditionaldataforinitialtraining.Theaimofthechapteris Provideabasisforthehandlingofabnormalprocedures tobeissued FCTM Reverse side blank 10.00.2TrainingGuide O.I.(30JUL04) TableOfContents TouchAndGo-around Approach.....................................................................................................10.80.1 Landing.......................................................................................................10.80.1 FCTM TrainingGuide10.00.1 TableOfContents O.I.(30JUL04) TABLEOFCONTENTS TrainingGuide Preface........................................................................................................10.10.1 ATA100Format..........................................................................................10.20.1 MELDescription..........................................................................................10.20.1 MELOperationalUse..................................................................................10.20.2 BriefingGuidelines BriefingProcedure.......................................................................................10.30.1 C-TWOAcronym.........................................................................................10.30.1 BriefingAide-memoire.................................................................................10.30.3 ExpandedTwoŽBriefingItems...................................................................10.30.3 BriefingExamples.......................................................................................10.30.6 SidestickCharacteristics.............................................................................10.40.1 OperatingSpeeds CharacteristicSpeeds.................................................................................10.50.1 ProtectionSpeeds.......................................................................................10.50.3 LimitSpeeds................................................................................................10.50.4 OtherSpeeds..............................................................................................10.50.5 PFD/FMACallProcedure PFD/FMAChangesToBeCalled...............................................................10.60.1 DescentManagement DescentProfileManagement......................................................................10.70.1 FCTM COMMS & NAV RNP Without GPS PRIMARY 1.*Itisacceptabletoentertheradialequivalentofthespecifiedcross-track Forexample,ifanairspaceorprocedurespecifiedanRNPof0.3nm,legacy FMSwilldisplaytheradialequivalentvalue0.37nmonthePROGpage(0.3x FCTM 9.90.1 TheaircraftnavigationsystemsrequiredbyregulationtoflywithinaRequired NavigationPerformance(RNP)airspaceshallcomplywithRNAVfunctionality criteria and with navigation position accuracy and integrity criteria. WhenreferringtoRNP-X,thevalueofXisthenavigationaccuracyexpressedin FCTM COMMS & NAV TCAS FCTM 9.80.3 O.I. (30 JUL 04) FCTM COMMS & NAV TCAS FCTM 9.80.1 Ifanintruderrepresentsapotentialcollisionthreat,avisualandauralTRAFFIC ADVISORYisgiven.Thisadvisoryaidsthecrewtoacquirevisuallytheintruder. AlsoitpreparesthecrewforapossibleRESOLUTIONADVISORY.However, Iftheintruderisconsideredasarealcollisionthreat,anauralandvisual FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 9.70.3 KIMMELbecomes KIMEL COTTONbecomes COTON RABBITTbecomes RABIT ADOLPHbecomes ADLPH BAILEYbecomes BAILY BURWELLbecomes BURWL ANDREWSbecomes ANDRS BRIDGEPORTbecomes BRIDT HORSBAbecomes HORSA FCTM Reverse side blank COMMS & NAV UnnamedfixesalongaDMEarcprocedureareidentifiedbyafivecharacter Charactersfromtwotofourindicatetheradialonwhichthefixlies.Thelast FCTM 9.70.1 O.I. (30 JUL 04) UN-NAMED OCEANIC CONTROL AREA REPORTING POINTS FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 9.60.1 O.I. (30 JUL 04) FCTM Reverse side blank INTENTIONALLY BLANK 9.50.21 ThecurrentATCcentresendsthe"NEXTDATAAUTHORITY"information ThecurrentATCcentresendsthe"ENDSERVICE"message.Itmayindicate FCTM COMMS & NAV ATSU And CPDLC FCTM 9.50.19 EMERGENCY................................................................................SELECT (1) PANPAN.........................................................................................SELECT (2) 1.TheemergencycanbecancelledbyusingtheCANCELEMERGENCY EMERG DISPL...............................................................................SELECT (5) ThemessageisdisplayedontheDCDU.Thecrewhastosendit,thenclose FCTM COMMS & NAV OTHER................................................................................................SELECT WILCO.................................................................................................SELECT FCTM 9.50.17 ATC MSG..............................................................................................PRESS OTHER...........................................................................................SELECT (1) LOAD..............................................................................................SELECT (2) LOADmustbeselectedatthispoint.Anyotherselectionmaypreventfurther loadingoftheclearance.The"LOADOK"informationisdisplayedtoconfirm thatloadingissuccessful.TheclearancecanbereviewedontheSECF- FCTM COMMS & NAV SEND..............................................................................................SELECT (1) WhentheAOCSECF-PLNUPLINKmessageisdisplayedonthescratchpad INSERT*.........................................................................................SELECT (2) TheflightplansentbytheADCisinsertedinthesecondaryflightplan.The REQ DISPL*...................................................................................SELECT (3) TheDCDUautomaticallypreparesamessage.Thecrewhastosenditto FCTM 9.50.15 O.I. (30 JUL 04) FCTM COMMS & NAV About30secondsbeforeDINTYtheappropriatepartofthemessage(relatedto FCTM 9.50.13 Inthisexample,ATChavegivenaclearancetoclimbataspecificpoint.The ATSUtriggersvisual(ATCMSGlight)andauralalertsanddisplaysthemessage FCTM COMMS & NAV ATC MSG..............................................................................................PRESS WILCO............................................................................................SELECT (1) SEND..............................................................................................SELECT (3) FCTM 9.50.11 Inthisexample,anATCmessageisreceivedinresponsetotheprevious TheATSUtriggersvisual(ATCMSGlight)andauralalertsanddisplaysthe FCTM COMMS & NAV Inthisexample,thecrewmakesarequestwhenalateralflightplandeviationis desiredduetoweatherreasons.Theuseofthe"WXDEVUPTO"prompt ensuresthattheATCattributesprioritytothisrequest.Thefollowingactions LAT REQ........................................................................................SELECT (1) REQ DISPL....................................................................................SELECT (3) TherequestisdisplayedontheDCDUwithabluebackground.Itisreadyto SEND..............................................................................................SELECT (4) CLOSE...........................................................................................SELECT (5) FCTM 9.50.9 AsforreportsthatareautomaticallygeneratedbytheFMGS,thepilotcan modifyamessagedisplayedontheDCDU.ItisthensenttotheATCbyusing theSENDfunctionkeyandisremovedfromthescreenbyusingtheCLOSE FCTM COMMS & NAV ThishastobedonewhentheAUTOPOSREPORTontheATCREPORTS FCTM 9.50.7 Whensequencingawaypoint,theFMGSautomaticallygeneratestheposition ThepilotmaymodifyitbyusingtheMODIFYfunctionkey.Then,hesendsitto FCTM COMMS & NAV Thissectiongivesonlyafewtypicalexamplesofthemessagesthatare FCTM 9.50.5 O.I. (30 JUL 04) Connection Before connection, the DCDU screen appears as below: FCTM COMMS & NAV TheFMGCprovidestheATCFLTnumber.Thenotificationprocedureisusedby theATCtocorrelatetheaircraftwiththeICAOflightnumber.Consequently,itis essentialtoenterexactlythesamenumber,shownontheICAOflightplan(with FCTM 9.50.3 O.I. (30 JUL 04) FCTM COMMS & NAV IftheARNisnotvalid,theMCDUscratchpaddisplaysthe"ENTERA/C REGISTER"message.Afterhavingclearedthescratchpad,thecrewinsertsthe ARNinthescratchpad.Pressingthe2LkeyontheCOMMINITpageentersthe IftheA/LIDisnotvalid,theMCDUscratchpaddisplaysthe"ENTERA/LIDENT" FCTM 9.50.1 Successfuldatalinkcommunicationsrequiresthatallinformationiscorrectly enteredinaccordancewiththeICAOflightplanduringATSUinitialisation.ATSU isautomaticallyinitialisedprovidedalistofserviceprovidershasbeenscanned FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 9.40.3 IftheSATCOMcallisonHOLD,thecrewmustcanceltheHOLDbefore DonotselectthePAimmediatelyafteraSATCOMcall.Thismayresultinthe PAbeingpermanentlyselected.FirstselectanothersystemontheACP,e.g. FCTM Reverse side blank COMMS & NAV OnceallinformationregardingthephonenumberisenteredintheMCDU,the crewusestheACPtoinitiatetheSATCOMcall.OntheSATCOMMAINMENU TheSATCOMchannel,usedtoinitiatethecall,isdisplayedabovethephone OntheACP,PRESStheSATtransmissionkeycorrespondingtotheselected SATCOMchannel.ThegreenlinesontheSAT1(2)transmissionkeyflash. OntheSATCOMMAINMENUpage,theDIALINGindicationreplacesthe READYTOCONNECTindicationinfrontofSAT1(2).Whenthecallis established,thegreenlinesontheSAT1(2)transmissionkeybecomesteady ontheACP.OntheSATCOMMAINMENUpage,CONNECTEDindication PROCEEDasforaVHForHFcall.However,withSATCOM,thetransmitbutton Incaseofanincomingcall,theamberlinesontheACPsSAT1(2)transmission keyflashandtheSATCOMALERTgreenmemoistriggeredontheECAM, OntheACP,thegreenlinesontheSAT1(2)transmissionkeybecome steady.OntheSATCOMMAINMENUpage,theCONNECTEDindication Ifthecrewselectsaradioforcommunication(HForVHF)whenaSATCOMcall ThegreenlinesontheSAT1(2)transmissionkeyflash.Thegreenlinesonthe selectedradio(HForVHF)transmissionkeycomeon.TorecovertheSATCOM callreselectthesameradio(HForVHF)ortheSAT1(2)transmissionkey.This FCTM 9.40.1 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) SATELLITE COMMUNICATION (SATCOM) FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 9.30.1 O.I. (30 JUL 04) AIRINC COMMUNICATION ADDRESSING AND REPORTING SYSTEM (ACARS) FCTM Reverse side blank INTENTIONALLY BLANK 9.20.1 TheRMPisusedtotuneallVHFandHFradiosaswellasallowingmanual FCTM Reverse side blank INTENTIONALLY BLANK 9.10.1 Thischapterdiscussesvariouscommunicationsystems,includingSATCOMand CPDLC,themonitoringofnavigationaccuracy,RNPcriteria,theHoneywell NamingConventionandTCASdisplays.Sometechniquesrelatedtoequipment FCTM Reverse side blank COMMS & NAV Traffic Alert And Collision Avoidance System (TCAS)..................................9.80.1 RNP...............................................................................................................9.90.1 RNP Capability..............................................................................................9.90.1 Radial Equivalence........................................................................................9.90.2 FCTM 9.00.1 Preface..........................................................................................................9.10.1 Radio Management Panel (RMP).................................................................9.20.1 Audio Control Panel (ACP)............................................................................9.20.1 AIRINC Communication Addressing And Reporting System (ACARS)........9.30.1 Satellite Communication (SATCOM).............................................................9.40.1 Air To Ground Communication......................................................................9.40.1 Ground To Air Communication......................................................................9.40.2 Hold Function................................................................................................9.40.2 Call Termination............................................................................................9.40.3 Air Traffic Service Unit (ATSU)......................................................................9.50.1 Controller/Pilot Datalink Communication (CPDLC).......................................9.50.6 FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 8.110.5 Dependingofthecauseofthefailure,thealtitudeindicationmayalsobe unreliable.However,thereareanumberofcorrectindicationsavailabletothe Whenflyingtheaircraftwithunreliablespeedand/oraltitudeindications,itis FCTM Non-normal Operations TheADRsprovideanumberofoutputstomanysystemsandablockageofthe Alphaflooractivation(becauseAOAoutputsfromthesensorsare AlwaysapplytheECAMprocedure.IfthefailureisnotannunciatedonECAM, Earlyrecognitionoferroneousairspeedindicationsrequiressomefamiliaritywith Ifitispositively confirmedthattheoutlierADRisatfaultandthattheothertwoADRsare correct,selectthefaultyADROFF.ThisactionwillgenerateanECAM procedure,whichshouldbeappliedinordertoreconfigurethePFDtodisplay However,inveryextremecircumstances,twoorallthreeADRsmayprovide identicalbuterroneousdata.Ifthereisanydoubt,then donotinstinctivelyreject theoutlierADR,althoughthetemptationmayexistiftheothertwoADRoutputs areconsistent.Inmostcases,thisdecisionwouldbecorrect,butnotinthecase wheretwospeed/altitudeindicationsareconsistentbutwrong.Applytheinitial actionsoftheUNRELIABLESPEEDINDICATIONQRHprocedurefrommemory astheyquicklyprovideasafeflightconditioninallphasesofflightandaircraft AfterapplyingtheQRHprocedure,andwhentheaircraftflightpathisstabilised, attempttoidentifythefaultyADR(s).OncethefaultyADR(s)has/havebeen positivelyidentified,it/theyshouldbeswitchedOFF.Thiswilltriggerthe corresponding ECAM procedure, which should be applied. FCTM 8.110.3 Normally,eachPRIMreceivesspeedinformationfromeachADIRUand comparesthethreevalues.Pressurealtitudeinformationisnotusedbythe PRIM.EachFEcomputerreceivesbothspeedandpressureinformationfrom Inafailuresituation,variouscombinationsofADRfaultsmayoccur,each aircraft,thereisnoECAMalert,howeveronePFDwilldisplay andenhanced aircraft,if oneADRoutputiserroneous,andifthisADRisusedtodisplaythespeed informationoneitherPFD,aNAVIASDISCREPANCYcautionis triggered.Inallcases,CAT3DUALwillbedisplayedasanINOPSYSon TwoADRoutputsareerroneousbutdifferentandtheremainingADR iscorrect,orifallthreeADRoutputsareerroneousbutdifferent. APandA/THRwilldisconnect.Ifthedisagreementlastsformorethan10 seconds,thePRIMtriggerstheNAVADRDISAGREEECAMcaution. FlightcontrolsreverttoALTN2law.TheSPDLIMflagisdisplayedon bothPFDs,howeverVLSandVSWarenotdisplayed.Thisconditionis FCTM Non-normal Operations Takingintoaccounttherunwaylandingdistanceavailable,modulatetheuseof brakestoavoidveryhotbrakesandtheriskoftyredeflation.Ingeneralfor A333/A343,brakeenergyandtyrespeedconsiderationsarenotlimitingevenin Initiatetheemergencydescentonlyuponpositiveconfirmationthatcabinaltitude andrateofclimbisexcessiveanduncontrollable.Carryoutthisprocedurefrom memory.TheuseofAPandA/THRisstronglyrecommendedforanemergency descent.TheFCUselectionsforanemergencydescentprogressfromrightto Athighflightlevels,extendthespeedbrakeslowlywhilemonitoringVLStoavoid theactivationofangleofattackprotectionThiswouldcausethespeedbrakesto Thefaultsensinglogicreliesonavoting principlewherebyifonesourcedivergesfromtheaveragevalue,itis automaticallyrejectedandthesystemcontinuestooperatenormallywiththe remainingtwosources.Thisprincipleappliestoflightcontrolsandflight However,theremaybesomecaseswheretheairspeedoraltitudeoutputis erroneouswithoutbeingrecognisedassuchbytheADIRS.Inthesecases,the cockpitindicationsappearnormalbutareactuallyfalseandpilotsmustrelyon theirbasicflyingskillstoidentifythefaultysourceandtaketherequired correctiveaction.Whenonlyonesourceprovideserroneousdata,asimple FCTM 8.110.1 Shouldanoverweightlandingberequired,alongstraightinapproach,orawide visualpattern,shouldbeflowninordertoconfiguretheaircraftforastabilised Therearenoadversehandlingcharacteristicsassociatedwithoverweight landings.LandingdistancewithCONF3orFULLatallgrossweightsisnormally lessthantake-offdistance.However,verifyrunwayfieldlengthrequirements fromthelandingdistancechartsintheQRHorFCOM2.Tyredeflationmay AutomaticlandinghasbeendemonstrateduptotheweightsspecifiedinFCOM 3.01.32.CONFFULListhepreferredlandingconfigurationprovidedthatthe approachclimbgradientcriteriacanbeachievedusingCONF3forthe go-around.Athighweightsandtemperatures,aCONF3approachisrequiredto satisfygo-aroundcriteria(QRHMaximumWeightForGo-AroundinCONF3 tablerefers).Inallcases,ifthelandingconfigurationisdifferentfromCONF FULL,selectFlaps1(CONF1+F)atinitiationofthego-around.Theapproach climbgradientcriteriaisneverlimitinginCONF1+F.Toensurethatmaximum thrustisavailableintheeventofago-around,selectthepacksoff,orusethe Ifago-aroundisperformedusingCONF1+F,VLSCONF1+Fmaybehigher thanVLSCONF3+5kt(VAPP).Inthiscase,followtheSRSorder,whichwill acceleratetheaircraftuptothedisplayedVLS.VLSCONF1+Fequatesto1.23 VS1gwhereastheminimumspeedforgo-aroundrequiredbyregulationis Anormalapproachisflownexceptthatinthefinalstagesoftheapproach,the FCTM Non-normal Operations Anenginetailpipefiretypicallyoccursatenginestartandresultsfromexcess fuelinthecombustionchamberoranoilleakinthelow-pressureturbinerace.A tailpipefireisaninternalfirecontainedwithintheenginewherenosensitive Shouldatailpipefirebereported,applythechecklistprocedure,whichrequires TheFIREpbmustnotbepushedasthiswouldde-energisetheFADECsand preventthemotoringsequence.TheAGENTpbsmustnotbepushedasthey providenobenefitwithextinguishinganinternalfire.Theprioritymustbegiven Ifatailpipefireisreportedwithnobleedairreadilyavailable,agroundfire FCTM 8.100.1 FollowinganAllEngineFlameout,theflightdeckindicationschangesignificantly asthegeneratorsdropoff-line.TheRATisdeployed,theEMERELECCONFIG warningisinhibitedandtheECAMprioritisesthechecklists.Controlofthe aircraftmustbetakenimmediatelybytheleftseatpilotandasafeflightpath TheAP,pitchtrimandruddertrimarenotavailable.Ifenginewindmillingis sufficient,additionalhydraulicpowermayberecoveredfromtheEDPsupplying Dependingontheexactsituation,assistancemaybeavailablefromATC regardinginformationsuchaspresenceofotheraircraftandsafeheadings.In Commencetheprocedurewithattentiontotheoptimumrelightspeedwithout starterassistwhichisinitially( :300kt/.82M) (A346:270kt) .Ifthereis norelightwithin30seconds,theQRH/ECAMordersenginemasterofffor30 secondsandthenonagain.Thisistopermitventilationofthecombustion chamber.Withoutstarterassist,allenginemasterswitchesmaybeselectedon StarttheAPUbelowFL250.BelowFL200,attemptanenginerelightusingAPU bleedforstarterassist. WhenusingAPUbleedforstarterassist,onlyoneengine mustbestartedatatime.Theoptimumspeedforstarterassistisgreendot, whichisnotdisplayedonthePFD.Consequently,usetheoptimumspeedwith APUbleedavailablefromthechecklistuntiltheQRHPart4canbeconsultedto FCTM Non-normal Operations FCTM 8.90.1 ShouldasingleFMGCfailureoccur,theAP/FDontheaffectedsidewill disconnect.It possibletorestoretheAP/FDusingtheotherFMGC.The A/THRremainsengaged.Furthermore,flightplaninformationontheNDand berecoveredbyusingtheFMswitching toestablishFMGCSINGLE ItispossibletorestoreAP/FDandA/THR WithoutAP/FDandA/THR,deselecttheFDpbs. SelectTRK/FPAtoallowthe FPVandbluetrackindextobedisplayed.Movethethrustleverstorecover manualthrust, selectNAVB/UPontheMCDUMENUpagetoestablishbackup andusetheRMPstotunethenavigationaids.RefertotheQRHfor FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 8.80.1 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) LANDING WITH NON-NORMAL GEAR FCTM Reverse side blank Non-normal Operations Thefollowingsummarisestheconditionoftheaircraftfollowingthepossible WithaHYDB+Yfailure,thestabiliserandmostofthespoilersarelost. TherewillbenoNWS,asthelandinggearwillhavebeenextendedusing thegravitysystem(toprotectthegreensystemintegrityfortheflight controls).Duetothelossofthestabiliserandthepartiallossofspoilers, VLSisincreasedby10kt.However,theelevatorsstilloperatenormally andautotrimisstillavailablethroughtheelevator.Normalbrakingis WithaHYDG+Bfailure,theslats,mostspoilers,theleftelevator,the innerailerons,normalandalternatebraking,anti-skidand( NWS)arealllost.Brakingisonlyavailableusingthebluesystem accumulator.Ifthisfailureoccursbeforeanyslathasbeenselected,a longrunwaywillberequired.Afterstopping,theparkingbrakemaybe WithaHYDG+Yfailure,theflaps,mostspoilers,therightelevator,outer ailerons,normalbrakingandNWSarelost.Again,ifthisfailureoccurs beforeanyflaphasbeenselected,alongrunwaywillbeneeded.Braking ThePNFshouldnotethecalculatedVAPPspeedandlandingdistance.The tableintheQRHgivesincrementsfordifferentslat/flapconfigurationsanditis FCTM 8.70.1 Singlehydraulicfailureshaveverylittleeffectonthehandlingoftheaircraftbut causeadegradationofthelandingcapabilitytoCat3Single.However,double ExtensiveECAMprocedureswithassociatedworkloadandtask-sharing Theelectricalpumpssupplyonlylimitedpowerandshouldnotbeusedto replacetheenginedrivenpumpstosupplytheflightcontrolsastheycannot coveranyhightransientdemands.Consequently,aircrafthandlingcouldbe degradedduetoflightcontrol“jerk”.Asageneralrule,donotselecttheELEC TheRATisdesignedtosupplytheEmergencyGeneratorandflightcontrols usingthegreenhydraulicsystem,andcancoverhightransientdemands. However,theRATflowissignificantlylessthananenginedrivenpumpflowand isdependentontheaircraftspeed.TheRATmaystillpressurisethegreen hydraulicsystemeveninthecaseofLOLVL.Itmustnotbeusedincaseof greenhydraulicsystemoverheat.Atlowspeed,theRATstalls.Consequently, Adoublehydraulicfailureisanemergencysituation,withLANDASAPdisplayed inred.DeclareaMAYDAYtoATCandlandassoonaspossible,however FCTM Non-normal Operations DESTINATION FCOM 3.04.28 refers. ADVOIDANCE OF NON-STANDARD FUEL DISTRIBUTIONS ON ARRIVAL FCOM 3.04.28 refers. AVOIDANCE OF FUEL INDUCED WING ICING ON ARRIVAL FCOM 3.04.28 refers. FCTM 8.60.1 FUEL LEAK Alifethatwillbeendangeredunlessimmediatemedicalattentionis Atimecriticalin-flightsituationthatrequiresanimmediatediversionand Theplanningandexecutionofanoverweightlandingrequiresgoodjudgement FCTM Non-normal Operations TheFlightEnvelopecomputercomputesCGasafunctionoftheTHSposition, andthisvalueisusedtomonitortheFCMC-computedCGandtriggertheAFT FCTM 8.50.3 TheQRHNOFLAPSNOSLATSLANDINGchecklistisarelativelysimple procedure.However,moredistanceisrequiredformanoeuvring.Duringthe approachtheaircraftpitchattitudeishigh,increasingtheriskofatailstrike. Consequently,onlymakeasmallpitchadjustmentintheflaretoreducetherate ofdescentpriortoapositivetouchdown.Duetothehightouchdownspeed, avoidaprolongedfloat.Theuseof( :MED) (A346:3/4) autobrakeis Duringtheapproachbriefing,emphasisetheconfiguration,callstobemadeand speedstobeflownintheeventofamissedapproach.Attheacceleration altitude,useselectedspeedtocontroltheaccelerationtotherequiredspeedfor Considerthefuelavailableandtheincreasedconsumptionassociatedwitha diversionwhenflyingwithflapsand/orslatsjammed.Cruisealtitudeislimitedto TheF/CTLELEVREDUNDLOSTprocedure,whichistriggeredincaseofdual failuresaffectingtheflightcontrols,isdesignedtopreparetheaircraftforathird relatedfailurewhichwouldresultinthesimultaneouslossofoneorboth elevatorsandsomeailerons.Theprocedurehastwoentrypointsdependingon Inanticipationofathirdfailurethatwouldresultinthelossofbothelevators,the Ifathirdfailurewouldresultinthelossofonlyoneelevator,thereisnoaileron FCTM Non-normal Operations canbeslightlyconfusingbutisdesignedtoallowtheextensionoftheflaps/slats totherequiredlandingconfigurationwhilecontrollingthespeedinasafe manner.Thisisparticularlyrelevantatheavyweights.Thepaperchecklist appearstocircumventnormaluseoftheECAMprocedureassociatedwiththe initialslatslockedmessage.However,itsintentistoresolveallSFCCissues, ratherthanjusttheinitialslatsSFCCissueandthusmorequicklyidentifythe achievablelandingconfiguration.UsethelowerofVFENextorPlacardSpeed. (VFENextonthePFDandplacardspeedsareidentical,exceptforFlap2where thePFDinitiallydisplaysVFENEXTforCONF1*againstaplacardspeedfor CONF2).Thespeedreductionandconfigurationchangesshouldbecarriedout ThefollowingscenarioonanA333assumesafailurewiththeslatslocking FCTM 8.50.1 Non-normaloperationoftheflapsand/orslatsmaybeduetooneofthefollowing Non-normaloperationoftheflapsandslatshassignificantoperational consequencessincethecontrollawsmaychange.Theattitudeonapproach changes,approachspeedsandlandingdistancesincreaseandthego-around proceduremayhavetobemodified.Themostsignificantfailureisadouble SFCCfault,whichleadstonotonlythelossofAPandA/THRbutalsoa FCTM Non-normal Operations Fire Protection CARGO SMOKE Ontheground,smokewarningsmaybetriggeredduetohighlevelsofhumidity orfollowingsprayingofacompartmenttocomplywithquarantineregulations.If aSMOKEwarningoccursonthegroundwithcargocompartmentdoorsopen,do notimmediatelydischargetheextinguishingagentwithoutfirstorderingthe groundcrewtoinvestigateandeliminatethesmokesource.Ifthewarningis FCTM 8.40.1 Fireand/orsmokeinthefuselagepresentthecrewwithpotentiallydifficult situations.Notonlywilltheyhavetodealwiththeemergencyitself,butalsothe passengersarelikelytopanicshouldtheybecomeawareofthesituation.Itis essentialtherefore,thatactiontocontrolthesourceofcombustionisnot FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 8.30.3 PresstheLANDRECOVERYpbpriortocommencingtheapproach.Thisallows therecoveryofanumberofsystemsrequiredforlanding,e.g.ILS1,SFCC1, LGCIU1 (andA333:BSCU1,LHWHC1,LHLandingLight) .Italsoshedsa numberofsystemsthatarenolongerrequired,e.g.theoperativefuelpump(s) Duringtheapproach,thecharacteristicspeedsmaynotbedisplayedonthePFD andcanbeextractedfromtheQRHpriortodescent.Onlyrawdataisavailable fortheapproach.Thelandinggearisextendedusingthegravitysystemto preventfluctuationsinthegreenhydraulicsystemwhilsttheEmergency Generatorisoperating,therebypreventingitfrompossiblydisconnecting. Consequently,asthedoorsremainopen,theNWSisnotavailable.Whenthe gearisextended,theaircraftrevertstoFlareLaw(Direct)and"USEMANPITCH TRIM"isdisplayedonPFD1.Thrustreversersautobrakeandantiskidarenot IftheRATpowerstheEmergencyGenerator,theavailablesystemsarefurther reducedandtherequirementtolandismoreurgent.Ofparticularnoteisthat thereisnopitchtrim,noruddertrim,noFMGC1andnoAP1.Uponselecting LANDRECOVERY,onlytheslatchannelofSFCC1isrecovered,sotheflaps arenotavailableforthelanding.Atslatextension,theEmergencyGeneratoris WhenELECEMERCONFIGoccurs,theLANDRECOVERYACandDC BUSESareinitiallyshedandwillremainsheduntiltheLANDRECOVERYpbis selectedON.Thisistrueevenifnormalelectricalconfigurationisrestored. Consequently,afterrestoringnormalelectricalpower,theLANDRECOVERYpb FCTM Non-normal Operations OnlyPFD1isavailable.TheAPwilldisengagewhenthefailureoccursbutAP1 canbereengagedonthe iftheEMERGENispoweredbyanEDP.As thereisnoAPavailableinthisconfigurationintheA340,theCaptainmusttake controlandflytheaircraftmanually.TheA340aircraftisoutoftriminrolldueto rightoutboardaileronupfloat,causedbynopowerbeingavailabletoPrim3or Sec2,andneitherpitchtrimorruddertrimisavailable.TheaircraftisinALTN law( duelossofslat/flapposition;A340duelossof2ADRs). Consequently,paycloseattentiontobankangleandheading. :isin N1degradedmode.Onceasafeflightpathisestablishedandtheaircraftis Itisimportanttocorrectlyidentifythefailure,asitispossibletoconfuse EmergencyElectricalConfigurationwithanAllEngineFlameout.Therefore,itis veryimportantthattheECAMtitleisreadaccuratelybeforestartingtheECAM actions.Theprocedureislengthyandcomplicatedand,asonlyoneECAM displayisavailable,disciplineduseoftheECPisessential.FCTMCh2refers. AlthoughtheECAMdisplaysLANDASAPinred,itisunwisetoattemptan approachatapoorlyequippedairfieldinmarginalweather.Considerthepower sourcefortheEmergencyGeneratorastheemergencygeneratoroutputs approximatelytwiceasmuchelectricalpowerwhenpoweredbytheEDP.The one) (A346:two) fuelpump(s)is/arepoweredandthecross-feed(s) FCTM 8.30.1 TheEmergencyElectricalConfigurationistriggeredbythelossofallAC busbars.ThisresultsintheautomaticengagementoftheEmergencyGenerator, drivenbytheGreenhydraulicsystemandpoweredbyeithertheEngineDriven Pump(EDP)ortheRAT,dependinguponthecauseofthefailure.Itismost unlikelythatthisconfigurationwilleverbeencountered,butbeawarethat workloadisimmediatelyincreasedinEmergencyElectricalConfiguration,The handlingofthisfailureisreferredtoasa"complexprocedure".Asummaryfor handlingtheprocedureisincludedintheQRH,whichshouldbereferredtoupon EMER GEN Powered by EDPEMER GEN Powered by RAT EMER GEN Powered by EDPEMER GEN Powered by RAT FCTM Non-normal Operations InthecruiseanencounterwithCAT,windshear,orstandingwavesmaycause thespeedtoincreaserapidly.Therecommendedtechniqueforrecoveryisto initiallyselectalowerspeedontheFCU,butnotbelowgreendot.Thiswillhave theeffectofcommandingtheautothrustsystemtoreducethethrust,whichmay IftheaircraftacceleratesaboveVMO/MMOandtriggersthehigh-speed protectiontheautopilotwilldisengageandthehigh-speedprotectionwillprovide anose-uporder.IfVMO/MMOisexceededsignificantlytheassociated overspeedauralwarningmayhaveoverwhelmedtheautopilotdisconnectaural Thepilotshouldnotpitchuptoreducespeed,butshouldattempttomaintainthe cruisealtitudebymakingsmoothinputsonthesidestick.Theautothrustsystem willbereducingthethrust,anditshouldnotbenecessarytodisconnectthe autothrust.Itispreferabletoleavetheautothrustengagedtoreduceworkload oncethecauseoftheoverspeedispassed.Inextremecasesthespeedbrakes Whenbelowthehigh-speedprotectionrange,checkautopilotengagement FCTM 8.20.15 Inalternateanddirectlaws,anauralstallwarning“STALL,STALL,STALL” soundsatlowspeeds.Recoveryisconventional.Applythefollowingactions FCTM Non-normal Operations AsTOGAisselected,PFcalls“GoAround,Flaps1,GearUp”.Thesedirectives Pitchcontrolwillresumethenormalloadfactorlawifthestickispushedforward ofneutral,butwillre-enteralphaprotectionifthestickisreleasedwiththe indicatedairspeedstillbelowV PROT.Consequently,toexitalphaprotection ThePFDshowstherecoveryclearly,becausetheindicatedspeedwillbeabove theblackandamberstripwhenoutofalphaprotection.Whennolongerinalpha protection,increasespeedaboveVLS(topoftheamberstrip)assoonasother Alphafloorwillnormallybetriggeredjustafteralphaprotectionisentered,and TOGAthrustwillbeappliedautomatically.Torecovertoanormalflight condition,alphaprotectionshouldbeexitedbyeasingforwardonthesidestick, asdescribedabove.The“alphafloor”thrustconditionshouldbecanceledby usingtheA/THRdisconnectpushbuttononeitherthrustleverassoonasasafe FCTM 8.20.13 Controloftheaircraftismorecomplicatedfollowingthelossoftwoenginesona singlewing.Thecriticalfactorisspeed,whichmustnotreducebelowVMCL-2 (157kt)untillandingisassured.VLSdisplayedonthePFDwillneverbelower thanVMCL-2.SpeedreductionbelowVMCL-2ispermissibleoncelandingis Autothrustisdisconnectedoncestabilisedonfinalapproach.AttheCommit Altitudewiththelandingassured,speedmaybereducedtonormalVAPP.Inthe caseoftwoenginesinoperativeonthesamewing,VAPPwillbebelowtheVLS displayedonthePFD(VMCL-2),e.gbasedontheMCDUVLSincaseoflossof twoenginesonthesamewing.SpeedreductionbelowVMCL-2isacceptableat thisstage,asVMCL-2isbasedontheuseofTOGAthrustontheremaining engines,andadequatemarginsremainatnormalapproachspeedsandthrust IfalandingisnotassuredbytheCommitAltitude(orimmediatelypriortoL/G extensionwithengines1and4inoperative),thenago-aroundshouldbe TOGAthrustshouldbeselected.AtcertainweightsandCGpositions,itmaynot bepossibletosatisfythe FCTM Non-normal Operations Aoneengineinoperativego-aroundissimilartothatflownwithallengines operating.OntheapplicationofTOGA,ruddermustbeappliedpromptlyto General Forthelossofanytwoenginesfromoppositewings,VLSontheMCDUand PFDislimitedtoVMCL( A343:125kt) (A346:132kt ).Thelossofengines1and 4doesnothaveamajoreffectoncontrol,howeverwithoutthegreenhydraulic FCTM 8.20.11 Autolandisavailablewithoneengineinoperative.MaximumuseoftheAP Ifanautolandisnotpossible,e.g.duetoairportequipmentlimitations,flya manualapproach.Amanualapproachandlandingwithoneengineinoperative isconventional.Useruddertrimtokeepthesideslipindicationcentred.The sideslipindicationremainsyellowaslongasN1ontheremainingengine(s)is below80% Withflapselectedandthrustabove 80%N1,theindicatorchanges totheengine-outmodeblue Acirclingapproachwithoneengineinoperativerequiresthedownwindlegtobe flowninCONF3,withlandinggearextended.Inhotandhighconditions,the aircraftmaynotbeabletomaintainlevelflightinCONF3withlandinggear down.Inthiscase,landinggearextensionshouldbedelayeduntilleavingthe circlingaltitude.Untilthegearislockeddownanddependingonthecircling altitude,itispossibletoreceivetheL/GGEARNOTDOWNECAMwarning (below750ftRA)oraGPWS“TOOLOWGEAR”(below500ftRA).However, withaminimumcirclingaltitudeof1000ftAALitisunlikelythatthisproblemwill FCTM Non-normal Operations Operating Techniques Standard Strategy (Long Range Strategy) FCTM 8.20.9 Proceedasabove.IfthefailureoccursaboveV2however,theSRSwill commandanattitudetomaintainthespeedatwhichthefailureoccurred.Inany FCTM Non-normal Operations Whenanenginefailureoccursaftertake-off,noiseabatementproceduresno FCTM 8.20.7 ForaFLEXtake-off,selectingtheoperatingengine(s)toTOGAprovides anadditionalperformancemargin,butisnotareducedthrusttake-off certificationrequirement.TheapplicationofTOGAveryquicklyprovidesa largethrustincrease.However,thiscomeswithasignificantincreasein yawingmomentandanincreasedpitchrate.TheselectionofTOGA ALT/NAVmodechangesmayoccurifTOGAisselectedaftertheALTpb FCTM Non-normal Operations IfanenginefailsafterV1thetake-offmustbecontinued.Stabilisetheaircraftat thecorrectpitchattitudeandairspeedandestablishcorrecttrackingpriortothe Theuseoftheautopilotisstronglyrecommended.Followinganenginefailure, trimouttherudderforcespriortoautopilotengagement.Thisrequires Ontheground,usetherudderconventionallytomaintaintheaircraftonthe FCTM 8.20.5 Case123456789 -- 305535 -- 450+250 250+160+470+275 -- 3550325 320+230+480+190+1000 Asuccessfulrejectedtake-off,atornearV1,isdependentupontheCaptain FCTM Non-normal Operations Operating Techniques FCTM 8.20.3 Duringtherejectedtake-off,theFirstOfficermonitorsandcalls"Spoilers,Rev Green,Decel"asappropriateand"70kt"duringdeceleration.Itisimportantto Ifthetake-offisrejectedpriorto72kt,thespoilerswillnotdeployandthe Iftheautobrakeresponsedoesnotseemappropriatefortherunway Iftheautobrakeisunserviceable,theCaptainshouldsimultaneouslyapply Ifnormalbrakingisinoperative,immediatelyselecttheA/SKID&N/W (A346:A/SKID) switchtoOFFandmodulatebrakepressureas Donotattempttocleartherunwayuntilitisabsolutelyclearthatan evacuationisnotnecessaryandthatitissafetodoso.Iftheaircraft FCTM Non-normal Operations Toassistinthedecisionmakingprocess,thetake-offisdividedintolowandhigh speedregimes,with100ktbeingchosenasthedividingline.Thespeedof100 ktisnotcritical,butwaschoseninordertohelptheCaptainmakethedecision andtoavoidunnecessarystopsfromhighspeed.Below100kt,theCaptain shouldseriouslyconsiderdiscontinuingthetake-offifanyECAMwarningis activated.Above100ktandapproachingV1,theCaptainshouldbe“go-minded” andonlyrejectthetake-offintheeventofamajorfailuresuchasafirewarning orseveredamage,suddenlossofthrust,anyindicationthattheaircraftwillnot flysafely,orifanECAMwarningoccurs. ExamplesofECAMwarningsthatmay occurareENGorAPUFIRE,ENGFAIL,CONFIG,SIDESTICKFAULT, REVERSERUNLOCKED,andL+RELEVFAULT Ifatyrefailswithin20ktof FCTM 8.20.1 Ifanenginefailureoccursatlowspeed,theresultantyawmaybesignificant, leadingtorapiddisplacementfromtherunwaycentreline.Forthisreason,itis essentialthattheCaptainkeephishandonthethrustleversoncetake-offthrust FCTM Non-normal Operations Theactuallandingdistanceismeasuredfrom50ftabovetherunwaysurface IfanemergencyprocedurecausesLANDASAPtoappearinredonthe Followingthefailureofanengineonatwin-enginedaircraft,anemergency situationexistsandtheCaptainshalllandatthenearestsuitableairfield.The FCTM 8.10.3 1.WhencomputingVAPP,windcorrectionisnormally1/3ofthetower headwindcomponent.If VLS20kt,then VLS+wind correctionshouldnotexceed20kt.Nowindcorrectionshouldbeappliedif 2.EnsureCONFFULLisselectedforthelandingconfigurationwhenusing IftheQRHdoesnotrequirea VREF,thenproceedasfornormaloperations FCTM Non-normal Operations General LANDING DISTANCE PROCEDURE Shouldafailureoccurwitha“LDGDISTPROCAPPLY”actiondisplayedonthe ECAMSTATUSpage,thepilotshouldentertheLDGCONF/APPSPD/LDG DIST/CORRECTIONSFOLLOWINGFAILUREStableinQRHPart2to Somefailures(typicallyslatorflap)increasetheVLS.Inthiscase,the VLSdisplayedonthePFDtakesintoaccounttheactualconfiguration. Forsomeotherfailures,thereisarequirementtoflyatspeedhigherthan VLStoimprovethehandlingcharacteristicsoftheaircraft.Inthiscase, ECAMprovidesaspeedincrement,called VLS,whichisdisplayedonthe STATUSpage.ThisspeedincrementistobeaddedtotheVLSdisplayed Inordertopreparetheapproachandlanding,thepilotneedstoknowVAPPin advance.TheappropriateVLSisnotnecessarilyavailableatthattimeonthe FCTM 8.10.1 Thischapterhighlightstechniquestobeusedinsomenon-normaloperations. Someoftheproceduresdiscussedinthischapteraretheresultofdoubleor triplefailures.Whilstitisveryunlikelythatanyofthesefailureswillbe encountered,itisusefultohaveabackgroundunderstandingoftheeffectthat theyhaveonthehandlingandmanagementoftheaircraft.Inallcases,handle Inthecaseofenginefailure,withoutanyrestrictionincludingautolandor Incaseofotherfailures,downto500ftAGLinallmodes,howevertheAP hasnotbeencertifiedinallconfigurationsanditsperformancecannotbe guaranteed.IftheAPisusedinsuchcircumstances,remainvigilantand bepreparedtodisconnecttheAPiftheaircraftdeviatesfromthedesired Monitoringandcross-checkingareessentialcomponentsofeffectiveprocedures andremainprimarytasksforallcrewmembers.ThePFshallmonitorall FCTM Non-normal Operations Fire Protection...............................................................................................8.40.1 Smoke...........................................................................................................8.40.1 Cargo Smoke................................................................................................8.40.2 Non-Normal Flaps/Slats Configuration..........................................................8.50.1 Elevator Redundancy Lost............................................................................8.50.3 Fuel Leak.......................................................................................................8.60.1 FCTM 8.00.1 Preface..........................................................................................................8.10.1 Use Of Autopilot............................................................................................8.10.1 Monitoring And Cross-Checking....................................................................8.10.1 Memory Items................................................................................................8.10.1 Landing Distance Procedure.........................................................................8.10.2 )..........................................8.20.12 Recovery From Alpha Protection And Alpha Floor......................................8.20.14 Stall Recovery.............................................................................................8.20.15 Recovery From High Speed Protection.......................................................8.20.15 Emergency Electrical Configuration..............................................................8.30.1 FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK FCTM Presentation TheFCTMdescribeshowtooperatetheAirbuswithdescriptionsofoperational techniques.Italsoincludesbackgroundinformationofamoretechnicalnature forreference.Someofthechaptershaveapreface,describingthechapterin FCTM General Information General OPERATIONAL PHILOSOPHY FCTM 2.10.1 ThischapterprovidesthefollowinggeneralinformationonAirbusdesign FCTM General Information General..........................................................................................................2.60.1 Normal Law...................................................................................................2.60.1 Alternate Law..............................................................................................2.60.10 Direct Law...................................................................................................2.60.11 Backup System...........................................................................................2.60.11 Abnormal Attitude Law................................................................................2.60.12 General..........................................................................................................2.70.1 Manual Thrust Control...................................................................................2.70.1 Autothrust......................................................................................................2.70.2 Autothrust Operational Aspects.....................................................................2.70.5 General..........................................................................................................2.80.1 Information Presentation...............................................................................2.80.1 Practical Uses Of The FPV...........................................................................2.80.2 FPV Considerations......................................................................................2.80.4 FCTM 2.00.1 Preface..........................................................................................................2.10.1 Manual Structure...........................................................................................2.10.1 Operational Philosophy.................................................................................2.10.2 General..........................................................................................................2.20.1 AP And A/THR Disconnect............................................................................2.20.1 Flight Mode Annunciator...............................................................................2.20.2 Reversion And Automatic Speed Protection Modes.....................................2.20.2 Triple Click.....................................................................................................2.20.3 Interface........................................................................................................2.20.3 FCU Handling................................................................................................2.20.3 Flight Directors..............................................................................................2.20.3 Non-normal Configurations...........................................................................2.20.4 General..........................................................................................................2.30.1 Flight Phase Specific Pages..........................................................................2.30.2 ECAM Handling.............................................................................................2.30.2 Use Of Summaries........................................................................................2.30.9 Crew Resource Management (CRM)............................................................2.40.1 Threat And Error Management (TEM)...........................................................2.40.1 Callouts.........................................................................................................2.50.1 Standard FMA Callouts.................................................................................2.50.1 Standard Phraseology...................................................................................2.50.1 FCTM 2.60.7 Onmostcommercialaircraft,themaximumloadfactorrangeis2.5g/ 1gclean and2g/0gwithslatsand/orflapsextended.Theloadfactorprotectionis designedtomaintaintheaircraftwithintheselimitswhileallowingthecrewto Oncommercialaircraft,highloadfactorsaremostlikelytobeencounteredwhen thepilotrespondstoaGPWSwarning.Airlinepilotsarenotaccustomedtousing FCTM General Information Thesefeaturesareaerodynamicprotections.Additionally,therearethreeenergy WiththeA/THRengaged,theaircraftwillnotdeceleratebelowVLS FCTM 2.60.5 Ifthepilotmaintainsthebackpressure,AlphaFloor(coveredbelow)willactivate. IfthepilotdisconnectstheA/THRwhilemaintainingfullbackstick,AlphaMax maybereached.ThespeedwhichequatestoAlphaMax(V MAX)isdisplayed asthetopoftheredstriponthePFDspeedscale.AlphaMaxiscloseto,but shortofthe1gstall.WhenflyingatV MAX,thepilotcanmakegentleturnsif necessary.Inturbulence,airspeedmayfalltemporarilybelowV MAXwithout FCTM General Information Toperformtheflareandlanding,theflightcontrolsneedtoberesponsiveand linear.Thereforeonreaching100ftontheapproachthepitchlawismodifiedto beafullauthoritydirectlawwithnoauto-trim.Anosedowntermisintroduced whichrequiresthepilottomaintainabackpressureonthesidesticktoachievea progressiveflare,asinaconventionalaircraft.Aftertouchdown,thecontrollaw However,itisimportanttorememberthatthenormalflightenvelopeisdefined asVLStoVMO/MMO.Pilotsshouldnotdeliberatelyflyataspeedoutsideofthe Thehighangleofattack(AOA)protectionallowsthepilottoconsistentlyachieve Thefollowingdescriptionillustratesasequenceofeventsthatwouldleadtothe FCTM 2.60.3 Inroll,whenaninputismadeonthesidestick,theflightcontrolcomputers FCTM General Information Inpitch,whenaninputismadeonthesidestick,theflightcontrolcomputers FCTM 2.60.1 TheAirbusflightcontrolsurfacesaremovedbycommandsfromseveralflight controlcomputersinresponsetopilotinput.Thissystemisreferredtoas FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 2.50.1 Avoidcasualandnon-essentialconversationduringcriticalphasesofflight, particularlyduringtaxi,take-off,approachandlanding.ThePFmakescallouts basedonFMAchangesappropriatetotheflightmode.ThePNFverifiesthe conditionfromtheFMAandacknowledges.IfthePFdoesnotmaketherequired FCTM Reverse side blank General Information Effectivemonitoringrequiressensibleworkloadmanagementtoensurethatthe PNFisnotoverloadedatacriticalphaseofflight.Thismayinvolvedelaying certaintaskstoamoreappropriatetime(Aviate,Navigate,Communicate). EffectivemonitoringalsoinvolvesthesharingofamentalmodelwiththePNF. Thisprincipleisknownascommunicationofintent.Initssimplestform, communicationsofintentisachievedthroughtheC-TWOdepartureandarrival AllcrewmembershavetheresponsibilitytoadvisetheCommanderanytime thatanunsafeorpotentiallyunsafeconditionexists.Thefollowingstrategyis Supportivestatement:expresspersonalconcern,usingstandardcallsif FCTM 2.40.1 Crewresourcemanagementistheapplicationofteammanagementconcepts andtheeffectiveuseofallavailableresourcestooperateaflightsafely.In additiontotheaircrew,itinvolvesallothergroupswhoareinvolvedinthe decisionsrequiredtooperateaflight.Thesegroupsinclude,butarenotlimited to,aircraftdispatchers,flightattendants,maintenancepersonnelandairtraffic Throughoutthismanual,techniquesthathelpbuildgoodCRMhabitpatternson theflightdeckarediscussed.Situationalawarenessandcommunicationsare stressed.Situationalawareness,ortheabilitytoaccuratelyperceivewhatis goingonintheflightdeckandoutsidetheaircraft,requireson-goingquestioning, Itisimportantthatallflightdeckcrewidentifyandcommunicateanysituation thatappearsunsafeoroutoftheordinary.Experiencehasproventhatthemost FCTM General Information ECAM Philosophy And Use QRH Summary Sequence FCTM 2.30.9 ThesummariesconsistofQRHprocedures.Theyhavebeencreatedtohelpthe crewhandletheactionsassociatedwithcomplexfailuresthatinvolve FCTM General Information ECAM Philosophy And Use FCTM 2.30.7 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) Example Of Crew Coordination And Crosschecking FCTM General Information Allscreensareidentical,providingredundancyeitherautomaticallyorby switching.Thevariousoptionstoallowswitchingofscreensintheeventof FCTM 2.30.5 ECAMproceduresandSTATUS,supplementedbyacheckonthePFD/NDare sufficientforhandlingthefault.Iftimepermits,andwhenECAMactionshave TheSTATUSpageisautomaticallyrecalledduring Mostfailuresarestraightforwardandshouldnotpresentanydifficultywhen handlingtherelatedECAMprocedure.Somefailures,however,canproduce multipleECAMproceduresandinthesecasesthefollowingpointsshouldbe FCTM General Information ThePFshallmonitorallECAM/checklistactions.Actionsassociatedwith FCTM 2.30.3 WhentheECAMdisplaysawarningorcautionthefirstpriorityistomaintaina safeflightpath.ThesuccessfuloutcomeofanyECAMprocedureisdependent ontheprecisereadingandactioningoftheprocedure,maintenanceofcorrect tasksharinganddeliberatemonitoringandcross-checking.Itisimportantto Incaseofafailureduringtake-off,approachorgo-around,ECAMactions shouldbedelayeduntiltheaircraftreachesatleast400ftAALandis stabilisedonasafetrajectory.However,anyauralwarningshouldbe cancelled using the MASTERWARN pb. ThePFistoflytheaircraft,navigateandcommunicate.TheuseoftheAP ThePNFistodealwiththefailureoncommandofthePF.Heis responsibleforreadingaloudandexecutingtheECAMorchecklist actions,whichincludesmanipulationofthrustleversandenginemaster ECAMactionsmaybestoppedbythePFatanytime,ifotherspecific actionsmustbeperformed;e.g.normalchecklist,applicationofanOEB, FCTM General Information TheECAMcontrolpanelisdescribedinFCOM1.31.30.Theoperationaluseof TheEMERCANCpbmaybeusedtocancelanycautionsthatare considerednuisancecautions,oraredisplayedasaresultofan acceptabledefectwiththeaircrafthavingbeendispatchedundertheMEL. ThisisindicatedontheSTATUSpageundertheCANCELLEDCAUTION TheRCLpbisusedtoeitherrecovercancelledcautionssuppressedby theEMERCANCpbortoreviewwarningsorcautionswhichhavebeen TheEMERCANCpbmayalsobeusedtoinhibitanyauralalert associatedwitharedwarning,butitdoesaffectthewarningitselfonthe OntheSD,somepagesarephasespecific,e.g.theWHEELpageis automaticallydisplayedafterenginestart.TheCRUISEpageisnotselectable butiscontinuouslydisplayedfrom1500ftaftertake-offtolandinggearextension unlessawarningorcautionisdisplayed,orasystempagehasbeenmanually TheTake-offandLandingmemosareonlydisplayedattheappropriatetime. ThefinalitemoneithertheBeforeTake-offchecklistortheLandingchecklistis toconfirmthatnoblueitemispresentonthememo,whichwouldindicatethata particularactionhadnotbeencarriedout.Beforeresponding"noblue",ensure thatthecorrectmemoisdisplayedbyreferencetothememotitle,i.e.T.O.or LDG.Incertaincircumstances,e.g.abasetrainingcircuit,theLDGMEMOwill notautomaticallyappear.Inthiscase,thePNFshallreadtheFINALITEMS, includingeachitemofexpandedLDGMEMO,fromthechecklistwhenthe WhencarryingoutECAMprocedures,bothpilotsmustbeawareofthepresent display.Beforeany“clear”action,bothpilotsshallcrosschecktheECAMdisplay toconfirmthatnoblueactionlinesremainthatcanbeeliminatedbydirect action,otherthanthoseactionsthatarenotsensedbyECAM,e.g.thrustleverat FCTM 2.30.1 TheECAMmonitorsanddisplaysallinformationconcerningaircraftsystemsas wellassystemfailures.Itisasystemwhich,throughtextandgraphicdisplays, Memoshouldbe included in the pilots routine scan. ECAMwarnings intheeventofafailure,theE/WDdisplayscrew actionsnecessarytodealwiththefailure,replacingthetraditional QRH.Whenthecorrectactionhasbeencarriedouttheapplicable lineoftheECAMchecklistwill,onmostoccasions,becleared. However,beawarethatnotallactionlinesareclearedbycarrying theSTATUSpageprovidesanoperationalsummaryofthe aircraftsystemsatanystageoftheflightandspecificallyfollowinga failure.IfSTSisdisplayedontheE/WD,theSTATUSpageis automaticallydisplayedontheSDwhenFlap1isselectedforthe FCTM General Information Withoneengineinoperative,theAPcanbeusedthroughouttheentireflight Innon-normalconfigurations,e.g.noflapsornoslats,theAPcanbeuseddown to500ftAALonapproach.Insuchcases,bereadytointervenemanuallyshould FCTM 2.20.3 TRIPLE CLICK The“tripleclick”isanauralalertdesignedtodrawthepilotsattentiontothe FMA.TheFMAhighlightsamodechangeorreversionwithawhiteboxaround ReversiontoCLB(OPCLB)mode,ifthepilotselectsaspeedontheFCU InhibitionofV/Smodeengagement,ifthepilotpullstheV/Sknobwhilein TheAPcanbehandledintwoways;"selected"forshort-termguidanceand "managed"forlong-termguidance.Short-termguidanceappliestoactionsthat arecarriedoutbythepilotontheFCU,e.g.inresponsetoanATCinstruction. Long-termguidanceappliestoinstructionsthathavebeenprogrammedintothe This ensures that the A/THR, if active, will operate in SPEED mode. FCTM General Information TheFMAislocatedatthetopofthePFDscreens.Itisdividedinto5columns whichindicatetheoperationalmodesoftheAP,A/THRandFD.Thecolumns ModechangesontheFMAarecalledbythePF,thencross-checkedand Asameansofattractingthecrew'sattentiontoachangeontheFMA,awhite boxisdisplayedfor10secondsaroundeachnewannunciation.Inthecaseofa modereversion,e.g.LOC/GStoHDG/V/S,theboxisdisplayedfor15seconds AmodereversioniswhentheAPand/orA/THRmodeschangeautomaticallyto ensuremodecompatibility.ThenewmodeisdisplayedontheFMAand FCTM 2.20.1 Theautopilotisdesignedtoflytheaircraftwithinthenormalflightenvelope.It canbeengagedshortlyaftertake-offandiscertifiedtoCat3Blimits.The autopilotisengagedusingthepush-buttons(pbs)ontheFCUandshouldbe Theautopilotautomaticallydisengagesiftheaircraftfliessignificantlyoutsidethe WhentheAPisdisconnectedusingthetakeoverpbonthesidestick,theaudio andvisualalerts(cavalrycharge,masterwarninglight,ECAMmessage)are cancelledbyasecondpushofthesidestickprioritypb.Similarly,whenthe A/THRisdisconnectedusingtheinstinctivedisconnectpbonthethrustlevers, theaudioandvisualalerts(singlechime,mastercautionlight,ECAMmessage) arecancelledbyasecondpushoftheinstinctivedisconnectpb.Inbothcases, FCTM 1.10.1 TheaircraftmodelslistedinthetablebelowarecoveredinthisFlightCrew Modelnumbersareusedtodistinguishinformationpeculiartooneormore,but notalloftheaircraft.Whereinformationappliestoallmodels,noreferenceis TheFlightCrewTrainingManualprovidesinformationandrecommendationson 1.FCTM Presentation. 2.General Information. 3.Pre-start, Start And Taxi. 4.Take-off And Initial Climb. 5.Climb, Cruise And Descent. 6.Holding And Approach. 7.Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in. 8.Non-normal Operations. 9.COMMS & NAV. 10.Training Guide. Chapter2coversproceduresandtechniquesnotassociatedwithaparticular manoeuvreorphaseofflight.Chapters3to7aretitledbyphaseofflightand containinformationaboutaircraftoperationsinthatphaseincluding,where appropriate,operationsinadverseweatherconditions.Chapter8covers non-normalsituationsandmanoeuvresassociatedwithallphasesofflight. Chapter9coversoperationalinformationonuseofcommunicationsand navigationequipmentandTCAS.Chapter10containsfurtherinformationto clarifystandardcall-outs,theCompanybriefingguideandvisualisationsofthe FCTM 7.30.1 Thermaloxidationisacceleratedathightemperature.Therefore,ifthebrakes absorbtoomuchheat,carbonoxidationwillbeincreased.Thisisthereasonwhy thebrakesshouldnotberepeatedlycycledabove500°Cduringnormal operation.Furthermore,afterheavybraking,theuseofbrakecoolingfanscould increaseoxidationofthebrakesurfacehotspotsifthebrakesarenotthermally equalised.Thermalequalisationisachievedabout5minutesafterthehigh ReleasingtheParkBrakedoesnothaveasignificanteffectonbrakecooling. FCTM Reverse side blank INTENTIONALLY BLANK 7.20.3 Ifasecondapproachistobeflown,activatetheapproachphaseviathePERF IftheALTNF-PLNisintheactiveF-PLNperformalateralrevision,preferablyat theTOWPT,toaccesstheENABLEALTNprompt.OnselectingtheENABLE ALTNprompt,thelateralmoderevertstoHDGifpreviouslyinNAV.Flythe aircrafttowardsthenextwaypointusingHDGorperformaDIRTOtoengage IftheALTNF-PLNisintheSECF-PLN,activatetheSECF-PLNandperforma DIRTOasrequired.TheACTIVATESECF-PLNpromptwillonlybedisplayedin IftheALTNF-PLNisnotstored,makealateralrevisionatanywaypointtoinsert Arejectedlandingisdefinedasago-aroundmanoeuvreinitiatedafter Oncethedecisionismadetorejectthelanding,committothego-around FCTM Reverse side blank Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in GATRKguidestheaircraftonthetrackmemorisedatthetimeofTOGA selection.ThemissedapproachroutebecomestheACTIVEF-PLNprovidedthe waypointshavebeencorrectlysequencedontheapproach.Thepreviouslyflown approachisplacedbackintotheF-PLN.Ifasecondapproachisrequired,it becomesavailablewhentheapproachphaseisre-activated.PushingforNAV enablesthemissedapproachF-PLNtobefollowed.IfbothAPshadbeen engagedpriortotheselectionofTOGA,thego-aroundwillbeflownwithboth APsremainingengaged.Wheneveranyothermodeengages,AP2disengages. TheFMGSmakesnopredictionsinthego-aroundphase.ConsequentlyCLB FCTM 7.20.1 Failuretoexecuteago-around,whenrequired,isamajorcauseofapproach andlandingaccidents.Asago-aroundisaninfrequentoccurrence,itis importanttobe"go-aroundminded".Thedecisiontogo-aroundshouldnotbe delayed,asanearlygo-aroundissaferthanonecarriedoutatthelastminuteat FCTM Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in PHASERECOMMENDED Phase(Expedite Selectmaximum Immediatelylowerthe nosegearontothe runwayandholdlight forwardsidestick Checkthe speedbrakesdeploy immediatelyafter Theautobrakesystem FCTM 7.10.21 PHASERECOMMENDED Flyawell-executed finalapproachwith theaircraftpositioned onglidepath,on runwaycentrelineand atthespeed recommendedfor Go-aroundifapproach LO/2 or 3/4) Autobrakeis recommendedprovided contaminationisevenly Withacrosswind,do notbemisledbythe relativebearingofthe runwayduetocrab anglewhenbreaking Donotfloatorallow drifttobuildupduring Userunwaylightingand markingsasdrift referenceindrifting Atouchdowninacrab establishesmaingear crabeffectandactuates theautospoilersandthe Driftingsnowcanlead toanillusionof Withacrosswind,do notde-crabpriorto Accomplishapositive touchdownasnearto thecentrelineas possibleat approximately1,500± Apositivetouchdown improveswheelspinup Decelerationonthe runwayisaboutthree timesgreaterthaninthe air.Donotallowthe Theaircraftshouldbe flownpositivelyonto therunwayevenifthe Ifalongtouchdownis FCTM Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in Duetothepotentialdirectionalcontrolproblemsassociatedwithlandingon contaminatedrunwaysincrosswindconditions,thecrosswindlimitationsare TheautomaticROLLOUTmode,hasnotbeendemonstratedonsnowcovered oricyrunways.TheROLLOUTmodereliesonacombinationofaerodynamic ruddercontrolandnosewheelsteeringtomaintaintherunwaycentrelineusing localizersignalsforguidance.Onacontaminatedrunway,nosewheelsteering effectivenessandthereforeaircraftdirectionalcontrolcapability,isreduced.Use themorerestrictiveoftheautolandorcontaminatedrunwaylandingcrosswind FCTM 7.10.19 Atermcommonlyusedtodescriberunwayconditionsiscoefficientoffriction. FCTM Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in Whenlandingonrunwayscontaminatedwithice,snow,slushorstandingwater, thereportedbrakingactionmustbeconsidered.TermsusedincludeGOOD, FCTM 7.10.17 Operationsonslipperyorcontaminatedrunwayshaveasignificantimpacton (A346:LO/2or3/4) autobrakeisrecommendedwhen landingonanevenlycontaminatedrunway.TheDECELlightontheAUTOBRK FCTM Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in Landing FCTM 7.10.15 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) FCTM Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in Landing FCTM 7.10.13 Abouncedlandingmaybecausedbyeitherone,oracombination,ofthe Shouldashallowbounceoccur,holdthepitchattitude.Donotattempttosoften Shouldasignificantbounceoccur,donotattempttocontinuethelandingbut holdthepitchattitudeandgo-around.Donottryandavoidasecondtouchdown duringthego-aroundbyincreasingpitchattitude.Shouldasecondtouchdown Themostcommoncausesfortheaircraftstructuremakinggroundcontacton Groundcontactoccursifthefiguresshowninthefollowingchartsareexceeded FCTM Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in AmaximumcrosswindforlandingisspecifiedinFCOM3.01.20.Thefiguresare FCTM 7.10.11 Heightoftheaircraftovertherunwaythresholdhasasignificanteffectontotal landingdistance.Forexample,ona3 glidepath,passingovertherunway thresholdat100ftratherthan50ftcouldincreasethetotallandingdistanceby approximately300m/950ft.Thisisduetothelengthofrunwayusedbeforethe A5ktspeedincrementonVAPPwillresultina5%increasetothedistance Aprolongedperiodoflevelflightabovetherunwaypriortotouchdownmustbe avoidedasitusesasignificantamountoftherunwaylengthavailable.Landthe aircraftasneartothenormaltouchdownpointaspossible.Decelerationonthe Theminimumstoppingdistanceisachievedbyapplyingmaximummanual antiskidbrakingwithmaximumreversethrustselectedandgroundspoilersfully FCTM Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in Landing Autobrakemaybedisengagedbybrakepedalapplicationorby( deselectingtheAUTO/BRKpb) (A346:rotatingtheselectortoDISARM) .The Theuseofautobrakedoesnotabsolvethepilotoftheresponsibilityofachieving Normallydelaymanualbrakinguntilafternosewheeltouchdowntovacatethe runwayattheappropriateturn-off.Toreducebrakewear,thenumberofbrake applications shouldbe limited. Manualbrakingmaybeappliedpriortonosewheeltouchdowne.g.onalimiting .Anticipateanincreasednosedownpitchrate.Applybrakessmoothly ThefieldlengthrequirementsarecontainedintheLandingPerformancesection ofFCOM2.Thelandingdistancemarginisreducedifthecorrectlanding FCTM 7.10.9 Theantiskidsystemadaptspilotappliedbrakepressuretorunwayconditionsby sensinganimpendingskidconditionandadjustingthebrakepressuretoeach individualwheelasrequired.Theantiskidsystemmaintainstheskiddingfactor (slipratio)closetothemaximumfrictionforcepoint.Thisprovidestheoptimum decelerationwithrespecttothepilotinput.Whenbrakingmanually,antiskid performanceisoptimisedbysmoothlyapplyingandmaintainingthedesired isnot Onveryshortrunways,theuseofmanualbrakingmaybeenvisagedsincethe pilotmayapplyfullmanualbrakingwithoutdelayaftermaingeartouchdown. (A346:TheACTIVlightilluminatestoindicate FCTM Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in Theimportanceofthetimelyuseofallmeansofstoppingtheaircraftcannotbe overemphasised.Executionofthefollowingactionswithoutdelaypermits stoppingtheaircraftwiththeleastlandingroll.Threesystemsareinvolvedinthe Thegroundspoilerscontributetoaircraftdecelerationbyincreasing aerodynamicdragandsoaremoreeffectiveathighspeed.Groundspoiler extensionalsomarkedlydecreaseslift.Thisincreasesloadonthewheelsand thereforeimprovesbrakingefficiency.Additionally,thegroundspoilerextension Selectreversethrustimmediatelyaftermaingeartouchdown.Thrustreverser efficiencyisproportionaltothesquareofthespeedandisthereforemost efficientathighspeeds.Below70kt,reverserefficiencydecreasesrapidly. Below60ktwithmaximumreverseselected,thereisariskofenginestall. Smoothlyreducethereversethrusttoidleat70kt.However,incaseof Normallyfullreversethrustshouldbeused.However,onlong,dryrunwayswith notailwindcomponent,idlereversemaybeused.Stowthereverserswhentaxi Ifairportregulationsrestricttheuseofreversethrust,selectandmaintain Wheelbrakescontributethemosttoaircraftdecelerationontheground.Many factorsmayaffectbrakingefficiency,e.g.loadonthewheels,tyrepressure, runwaypavementcharacteristics,runwaycontaminationandbrakingtechnique. Theonlyfactoroverwhichthepilothasanycontrolistheuseofthecorrect FCTM 7.10.7 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) TAILSTRIKE PROTECTION AND PREVENTION · VAPP being decreased below the calculated value · A high flare with engine power at idle · A high sink rate just prior to flare · Attempting to touchdown too smoothly (higher pitch attitude) · A prolonged flare and float · Pitching up following a bounce to avoid a second hard touchdown On aircraft,thePNFshouldcall“PITCH”ifpitchattitudeexceeds 7.5ºin the flare. TheA346tailstrikeprotectionsystemprovidespitchlimitindicationonthePFD below400ftRAonapproachandanauralalertof“PITCH,PITCH”below14ft RAincaseofexcessivepitchattitudeintheflare.Intheeventofatailstrike,an Onlanding,therearmainwheelstouchdownfirst.Theaftsidestickinputapplied fortheflareshouldthenberelaxedtowardstheneutralposition.Thisallowsthe aircrafttoderotatenaturallyuntilfrontmaingearcontact.Aftermaingear touchdown,flythenosedownconventionally,controllingthederotationrateto ensureasmoothnosewheeltouchdown.Lowerthenosewheelwithoutdelay.Do notkeepthenosehighinordertoincreaseaircraftdragduringtheinitialpartof therollout.Thistechniqueisinefficientasitreducesbrakingefficiencyby delayingfullweight-onwheels,increasestheriskofahardnosewheel touchdownandalsoincreasestheriskoftailstrike.Ifbrakingisappliedwiththe nosehigh,uptofullbackstickmayberequiredtocontrolthenosedownpitching Aftertouchdown,withreversethrustselectedonatleastoneengineandone mainlandinggearstrutcompressed,thegroundspoilerspartiallyextendto furtherestablishgroundcontact.Thegroundspoilersfullyextendwhenboth mainlandinggearsarecompressed.Asmallnosedowninputontheelevatorsis introducedbythecontrollaw,whichcompensatesthepitchuptendencywith Duringtherollout,usetherudderpedalstomaintaintheaircraftontherunway centreline.Athighspeed,directionalcontrolisachievedwithrudder.Asthe speedreduces,nosewheelsteeringbecomesactive.Thesteeringhandwheelis FCTM Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in CAT IIICAT II ( q = 2 ° 9) ( q = 4 ° 2) 50 ft ( q = 2 ° 1) ( q = 3 ° 0) 100 ft ( q = 2 ° 1) ( q = 3 ° 0) Visual Segment 60 m (197 ft) ft) A38 ft44 ft77 ft127 ft ft)] ft) ft)] 1.Where different, A346 values are shown in [ ]. FCTM 7.10.5 ThetechniquesbelowassumeastabilisedapproachatVAPPandonthe glidepath.Unlessanunexpectedorsuddeneventoccurs,e.g.windshear,itis notappropriatetousesuddenorabruptcontrolinputsduringlanding.Additional considerationsapplicabletolandingsincrosswindandslipperyrunway Autotrimceasesat100ftandthepitchlawismodifiedtotheflaremode,as describedinFCTMCh2.Atthispoint,abackpressureonthesidestickis Theflaretechniqueisconventional.Commenceagentle,progressiveflarejust afterthe40ftauto-callout.Thetypicalpitchincrementintheflareis approximately2 ,associatedwithabouta5ktspeeddecayinthe FCTM Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in ThePAPIisasystemof4lightswhicharenormallyinstalledontheleftsideof therunway.TheprincipleofoperationissimilartotheVASIbutusingasingle Whentheaircraftisonanormal3 glidepath,thepilotseestwowhiteandtwo redlights.ThePAPImaybesafelyusedwithrespecttothresholdcrossing height.ThestandardPAPIinstallationisarrangedsuchthattheapproachpath FCTM 7.10.3 Onrareoccasions,atwobarVASIsystemmaybeencountered.Thesesystems WhenflyinganapproachusingaT-VASIsystem,anindicationofonelighthigh FCTM Landing, Go-around & Taxi-in Landing FCTM 7.10.1 Whenavailable,PAPI,VASIorILSglideslope,providecuestoassistin maintainingthecorrectpathinthelatterstagesoftheapproach.Thecorrect approachpathbringstheaircraftto1000ftbeyondtherunwaythreshold.Thisis thevisualaimpoint.Assumingaconstantspeedandattitude,thispointshould notmoverelativetothewindscreen.Makesmallcontrolinputsasrequiredto Closetotheground,highsinkratesmustbeavoidedevenattheexpenseof maintainingglideslopeorthevisualaimpoint.Priorityshouldbegiventocorrect attitudeandsinkrate.Ifrunwaylengthislimiting,ago-aroundshouldbe initiated. TheVASIisasystemoflightsarrangedtoprovidevisualdescentguidance informationduringtheapproach.FlyingtheVASIglideslopetotouchdownisthe sameasselectingavisualaimpointontherunwayadjacenttotheVASI FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 7.00.1 Visual Aim Point............................................................................................7.10.1 Visual Approach Slope Indicator (VASI/T-VASI)...........................................7.10.1 Precision Approach Path Indicator (PAPI)....................................................7.10.4 Flare..............................................................................................................7.10.5 Tailstrike Protection And Prevention.............................................................7.10.7 Derotation......................................................................................................7.10.7 Rollout...........................................................................................................7.10.7 Braking..........................................................................................................7.10.8 Factors Affecting Landing Distance.............................................................7.10.10 Crosswind Landing......................................................................................7.10.12 Bounced Landing Recovery........................................................................7.10.13 Ground Clearance.......................................................................................7.10.13 Adverse Weather.........................................................................................7.10.17 Preface..........................................................................................................7.20.1 AP/FD Go-around Mode Activation...............................................................7.20.1 Leaving The Go-around Phase.....................................................................7.20.2 Rejected Landing..........................................................................................7.20.3 Brake Temperature.......................................................................................7.30.1 Park Brake Use.............................................................................................7.30.1 Adverse Weather...........................................................................................7.30.1 FCTM Reverse side blank INTENTIONALLY BLANK 6.70.3 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) FCTM Holding And Approach RolloutoftheturnontheextendedrunwaycentrelineandmaintainVAPP. Thrustshouldbestableby1000ft.Usethespeedtrendarrowtoanticipate thrustchangesandtheFPVtomonitorapproachpathdeviations.Useavailable G/Sand/orPAPIsaswellasthevisualpicturetoassistinmaintainingastable Acontinuousvisual/instrumentscanisrequiredtoflyasuccessfulapproach.An effectivescanwillassistinhighlightingsmallerrors,allowingsmall,early A3 slopewillnormallybeflownwithaRODofapproximately700ft/min;a higherRODisanindicationthattheaircraftisabouttodescendbelowtheideal approachpath.Asmallcorrectionofapprox1 ofpitchwillchangetheRODby approximately100ft/min.Azimutherrorswillrequirebankanglechangesbothto stopthedriftandthentorecovertothecentreline.Avoidusingbankangles FCTM 6.70.1 Plantostartavisualapproachat1500ftAAL,2.5nmabeamtheupwind TheflightplanselectedontheMCDUshouldincludetheselectionof thelandingrunwaysuchthatmanagedspeedisavailable.Thedownwindleg mayalsobepartoftheflightplan.Thismayproduceausefulindicationonthe FCTM Holding And Approach Ifamissedapproachisrequiredatanytimewhilecircling,makeaclimbingturn towardsthelandingrunway.Considermaintainingthemissedapproachflap FCTM 6.60.1 Aninstrumentapproachtoonerunway,followedbyavisualpatterntolandon anotherrunway,istermedacirclingapproach.Companycirclingminimamaybe FCTM Holding And Approach MonitortheapproachusingFPV/FPDandVDEVonthePFD,XTKand F-PLNwaypointsontheNDwithGPSPRIMARY,andconfirmedby navaidsforVOR,NDBandoverlayapproaches.ForLOCandLOCB/C courseapproaches,monitorlateraldisplacementusingtheLOCpointeron thePFD.Cross-checkaltitudesanddistanceswiththosepublishedonthe FCTM 6.50.9 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) · V/DEV appears in approach phase with FINAL armed. · Ensure raw data is correctly displayed. · FINAL APP engages when the aircraft intercepts the vertical flight path. · FCTM Holding And Approach Ensurethattheaircraftislaterallystabilisedonthefinalapproachcoursebefore reachingthefinalapproachfix(FAF).Itacceptabletogodirecttotheapproach fixesorusetheRADIALINfunction,providedtheinboundcourseisclosely alignedwiththefinalapproachcourseandtheresultingchangetoaircraftcourse Tocommenceamanagedapproach,presstheAPPRpb.APPNAVisdisplayed ingreenontheFMAwithFINALinblue.TheV/DEVscalebecomesactiveand representstheverticaldeviationfromthemanageddescentprofile,whichmay includealevelsegment.TheV/DEVscalewillonlybedisplayediftheLSpbis IfFINALAPPdoesnotengageatthedescentpoint,selectanFPAvaluetoallow convergencewiththefinalapproachpath.WhenVDEVisindicatingthatthe verticalprofilehasbeenreached(VDEV=0),attempttore-engageFINALAPP Foraselectedapproach,useTRKmodetoestablishfinalcoursetrackingwith referencetorawdata.Whenestablishedonthefinalcourse,theselectedtrack ShouldATCgivevectorstowardstheFAF,theuseofthe"DIRTORADIALIN" functionwillprovidearepresentationoftheextendedcentrelineandcross-track FCTM 6.50.7 SomechartsprovideatableofDMEversusaltitude.Onthosechartswhichdo nothavethistable,anexpectedFPAforthefinalapproachcanbecalculatedby dividingthefirst2digitsoftheheightattheFAFbythedistancetogo,e.g.2000 ftat6nmequatestoa3.3 FCTM Holding And Approach Non-precision Approach FCTM 6.50.5 Theapproachinthenavigationdatabasemustbevalidatedbyscrupulous FCTM Holding And Approach ThefollowingtwostrategiesareavailableforperformingRNAVandGPS LateralandverticalguidancemanagedbytheFMinFINALAPPmode. Thisistherecommendedstrategy.Thisstrategyshallbeusedfor LateralguidancemanagedbytheFMandverticalguidanceselectedby thecrewusingNAV-FPAmodes.Thisstrategymaybeusedforapproach withminimadefinedasaminimumdescentaltitude(MDA),andshallbe usedforapproacheswhichareconductedwhenthetemperatureisbelow AmanagedapproachcanbecontinuedfollowingaNAVACCURDOWNGRADif BothGPSsmustbeavailableandGPSPRIMARYdisplayedonbothMCDUs priortocommencingtheapproach.Howeveroncetheapproachhas commenced,notethatasinglefailure,suchasNAVGPS1FAULT,willnot causethelossofGPSPRIMARY,sincetheremainingGPSwillupdateboth FMGS.IfGPSPRIMARYLOSTisdisplayedontheND(s),itwillbe accompaniedbyatriple-clickauralalert,eventhoughNAVACCURACYHIGH CrewproceduresfollowingaNAVFM/GPSPOSITIONDISAGREEcaution,orif FCTM 6.50.3 IftheLOCB/CisnotstoredintheFMSdatabase,entertheILSfrequencyand theintendedfinalapproachcourseprecededbya“B”intheRADNAVpage. “B/C”willbedisplayedinmagentanearthelocaliserdeviationscaleonboththe PFDandND.ThiswillprovidedeviationindicationsonthePFDandNDinthe correctsense,andproperdirectionalguidancebytheFGcomputers.However, donotselecttheLSpbonISIS,sincetheISISdisplaysB/Clocaliserdeviationin Insert ILSfrequency WhentheLOCpbispressed,“LOCB/C”isannunciatedinblueontheFMAto indicate that the localiser back course is armed. FCTM Holding And Approach Non-precision Approach FINAL APPROACH STRATEGY FCTM 6.50.1 AnRNAVapproachisaninstrumentapproachprocedurethatreliesonaircraft areanavigationequipment(FMS)fornavigationalguidance.TheFMSonAirbus aircraftiscertifiedRNAVequipmentthatprovideslateralandverticalguidance referencedfromanFMSposition.TheFMSusesmultiplesensorsforposition AGPSapproachisanRNAVapproachrequiringGPSpositionupdate.Airbus aircraftusingFMSastheprimarymeansofnavigationalguidancehavebeen Non-ILSapproachesareflownusingFINALAPPorFPApitchmodesandLOC, FCTM Holding And Approach CAT3SINGLEisannunciatedontheFMAwhentheaircraftsystemsare fail-passive,whichmeansthatasinglefailurewillleadtoAPdisconnectwithout anysignificantoutoftrimconditionordeviationfromtheflightpathorattitude. Thefailuresthatmayaffecttheaircraft’sCAT2/3capabilityarelistedinthe QRH.Mostofthesystemsrequiredforthedifferentautolandcapabilitiesare thereducedapproachcategorywillnotbedisplayedontheStatuspage.In addition,reducedapproachcapabilitiesdisplayedontheStatuspageare removedandtransferredtotheFMAwhentheAPPRpbispushed approachcapabilitiesthatcanbedisplayedontheFMAareCAT1,CAT2,CAT 3SINGLEorCAT3DUAL.Therearealsoanumberoffailureswhichaffectthe aircraft’slandingcapabilitythatarenotmonitoredbytheFMGSandare Followinganyfailurethatdoesnotincuralandingcapabilitydowngradeon ECAMSTATUSorFMA,refertothe"LandingCapabilityEquipmentRequired" Shouldafailureoccurabove1000ftRA,allECAMactions,includingDH FCTM 6.40.7 AdditionalbriefingitemsshouldbeconsideredbeforecommencingCAT2/3 AirportcapabilitiesregardingLWMOandautolandarestipulatedontherelevant PortPage.Theairportauthoritiesareresponsibleforestablishingand maintainingtheequipmentrequiredforCAT2/3approachandlanding.Priorto SpecificwindlimitationsforCAT2/3approachesandautolandsapply.FCOM Correcteyepositionisparticularlyimportantduringlowvisibilityapproachesand landings.Whentheeyereferencepositionistoolow,thevisualsegmentis FCTM Holding And Approach ILSantenna at50ftat Pitchangle 3.7 ° ) 3 ° ) Path ( ° ) G/S Trans A B Touchdown Point C ° 5 348 m 1142 ft 153 m 502 ft 661 ft 640 ft 481 ft ° 291 m 955 ft 132 m 433 ft 555 ft 522 ft 400 ft FCTM 6.40.5 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) MANUAL RAW DATA ILS FCTM Holding And Approach Ifanairporthasanumberofactivelandingrunways,programmetheSECF-PLN withtheILSforanalternativerunwayduringtheapproachpreparation,tocover thepossibilityofalaterunwaychange.Thereisnorequirementtoenterthe FCTM 6.40.3 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) FCTM Holding And Approach Thefollowingprocedureshouldonlybeappliedwhenestablishedonthe localiser,witheitherLOC*orLOCdisplayedingreenontheFMA.Thebestrate ofdescentisachievedwiththelandinggearextended,Flaps2selectedand flyingatVFE2 5kt.Speedbrakesmayalsobeused,notingtheconsiderations FCTM 6.40.1 CheckthattheLSpbhasbeenpressedandthattheLOCandGSscalesare FCTM Holding And Approach Thechecklistactionsforpredictive“WINDSHEARAHEAD”warningonapproach allowthatintheevent“apositiveverificationismadethatnohazardexists,the warningmaybeconsideredcautionary”.Thisnotetotreatthepredictivewarning ascautionaryisincludedonlyasanacknowledgementofthePWSsystem limitations.PWStechnologyreliesonDoppleranalysisofwaterparticle movement,andthegeographicalsituationassociatedwithparticularwind conditionsmaygeneratefalsewarningswherenohazardsexist.Itshouldonly betreatedascautionaryoncarefulanalysisandwhereanearlypositive SelectionoftheTERRONNDpbwillinhibitthedisplayoftheWINDSHEAR Ingustywindconditions,theA/THRresponsetimemaybeinsufficienttocope withaninstantaneouslossofairspeed.Amorerapidthrustresponsecanbe FCTM 6.30.7 Ifseverewindshearordownburstconditionsareexpected,considereither delayingtheapproachordivertingtoanotherairport .Assessconditionsfora The weather radar pictureand PWS alerts. Choosethemostfavourablerunwayinconjunctionwiththemostappropriate approachnavaid(e.g.ILSorGPS)andconsiderusingFLAPS3forlanding. IftheAPisengaged,itshouldremainengaged.Itwilldisengageifand Theconfigurationshouldnotbechangeduntilpositivelyoutoftheshear FollowtheSRS,evenifthisrequirestheuseoffullbackstick.Asthe speedbeginstorecover,thepilotcanreducebackstickwhilestillfollowing Onreceiptofapredicitive“WINDSHEARAHEAD”warning,applythechecklist actionsfrommemory.SelectTOGAandfollowtheSRS.ThePFcalls FCTM Holding And Approach InNAVmode,theF-PLNwillsequenceautomatically.InHDG/TRKmode,the F-PLNwillonlysequenceautomaticallyiftheaircraftfliesclosetothe programmedroute.CorrectF-PLNsequencingisnecessarytoensurethatthe programmedmissedapproachrouteisavailableintheeventofago-around.If underradarvectorsandautomaticwaypointsequencingdoesnotoccur,the F-PLNshouldbemanuallysequenced.Thiscanbeachievedbyeitherusingthe FCTM 6.30.5 Managedspeedisrecommendedforthefinalapproach.Oncetheapproach phasehasbeenactivated,theA/THRcontrolsthespeedtotheminimum Toachieveaconstantdecelerationandminimisethrustvariation,selectthenext (A343:CONF3) (A333:CONFFull). FCTM Holding And Approach Instrument Approaches Example of GS MINI FCTM 6.30.3 Theminimumenergylevelistheenergytheaircraftwillhaveatlandingwiththe expectedtowerwind,representedbythegroundspeedatthattimewhichis Inordertoachievethis,theaircraftgroundspeedmustneverdropbelowGSmini duringtheapproachwhilethewindsarechanging.Therefore,theIAS(VAPP FCTM Holding And Approach Donotcompromisethestabilisedapproachcriteriatosatisfynoiseabatement procedures.Whereairportnoiseabatementproceduresspecifytheuseof minimumflapforlanding,fullflapshouldbeusedunlessoperationalor Activationoftheapproachphaseinitiatesadecelerationfrommanageddescent speed.InNAVorLOCmode,theapproachphaseactivatesautomaticallywhen sequencingthedecelerationpseudo-waypoint.WheninHDGmodeorifanearly decelerationisrequired,theapproachphasecanbeactivatedviathePERF FCTM 6.30.1 Thissectioncoversgeneralinformationapplicabletoallapproachtypes. Techniqueswhichapplytospecificapproachtypesarecoveredlaterinthe Duringtheapproachphase,theaircraftmaybeoperatingatorbelowMSA,often inadverseweatherinahighworkloadenvironment.AlthoughATCmaybe providingradarvectorstotheinitialorfinalapproachfix,maintaininggood IfGPSPRIMARYisnotavailable,anavigationaccuracycheckistobecarried FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 6.20.1 Procedureturnsmustbeflownusingselectedmodes.Onsomeapproachesthe FCTM Reverse side blank Holding And Approach AsthenumberofholdingpatternstobeflowncannotbeinsertedintheFMGS, theholddistanceisnotincludedinthedescentpathcomputation.Afterthe holdingfixissequenced,theFMGSassumesthatonlythecurrentholding patternwillbeflownandupdatespredictionsaccordingly.Onceintheholding A333+ 1.5%+ 3.5% A343+ 4%+ 5.5% A346+ 1%+ 4% FCTM 6.10.1 Wheneverholdingisanticipateditispreferabletomaintaincruiseleveland reducespeedtoGreenDot,withATCapproval,tominimisetheholding requirement.However,otheroperationalconstraintsmaymakethisoption inappropriate.Aholdingpatterncanbeinsertedatanypointintheflightplanor maybeincludedaspartoftheSTAR.Ineithercase,thecrewcanmodifythe Ifaholdistobeflown,providedNAVmodeisengagedandthespeedis managed,anautomaticspeedreductionwilloccurtoachieveaspeedcloseto GreenDotwhenapproachingtheholdingpattern.GreenDotcorrespondstoan approximationofthebestlifttodragratioandprovidesthelowesthourlyfuel consumption.IfGreenDotisgreaterthantheICAOorstatemaximumholding speed,requestahigherspeedfromATC.Ifthisisnotapproved,selectFlaps1 andflyattherequiredspeed.Fuelconsumptionwillbeincreasedwhenholding TheFMGScomputestheapplicableholdentrywhichshouldbecross-checked. FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 6.00.3 Preface..........................................................................................................6.70.1 FCTM Reverse side blank Holding And Approach Adverse Weather...........................................................................................6.30.7 One Engine INOP..........................................................................................6.30.8 Initial Approach..............................................................................................6.40.1 Interception Of Final Approach Course.........................................................6.40.1 Final Approach..............................................................................................6.40.1 Glideslope Interception From Above.............................................................6.40.2 Late Runway Change....................................................................................6.40.4 Manual Raw Data ILS...................................................................................6.40.5 Low Visibility Procedures..............................................................................6.40.7 Or When LVP Are Not In Force...............................................................6.40.8 Preface..........................................................................................................6.50.1 Final Approach Strategy................................................................................6.50.2 Navigation Alerts...........................................................................................6.50.4 F-PLN Crosscheck........................................................................................6.50.5 Initial Approach..............................................................................................6.50.7 Intermediate Approach..................................................................................6.50.7 FCTM 6.00.1 Preface..........................................................................................................6.10.1 ICAO/FAA Maximum Holding Airspeeds.......................................................6.10.1 Holding Speed And Configuration.................................................................6.10.1 Holding Entry Procedures.............................................................................6.10.1 In The Holding Pattern..................................................................................6.10.2 Adverse Weather...........................................................................................6.10.2 Procedure Turns............................................................................................6.20.1 Procedural Approaches.................................................................................6.20.1 Track Establishment......................................................................................6.20.1 Preface..........................................................................................................6.30.1 Navigation Accuracy......................................................................................6.30.1 Approach Briefing..........................................................................................6.30.1 Approach Category.......................................................................................6.30.1 Landing Minima.............................................................................................6.30.1 The Flying Reference....................................................................................6.30.1 Delayed Flap Approach (Noise Abatement)..................................................6.30.2 Approach Phase Activation...........................................................................6.30.2 Approach Speed Considerations...................................................................6.30.2 Deceleration And Configuration Change.......................................................6.30.5 F-PLN Sequencing........................................................................................6.30.6 Use Of A/THR...............................................................................................6.30.6 FCTM Climb, Cruise And Descent Descent DESCENT ADJUSTMENT FCTM 5.30.5 ThemanageddescentspeedcomputedbytheFMGSdefaultstoECONspeed andprovidesthemosteconomicaldescentprofileasittakesintoaccount weight,actualandpredictedwinds,ISAdeviationandCostIndex(CI).Ifaspeed isinsertedintothePERFDESpageforoperationalorpolicyreasons,thenthis becomesthemanagedspeedforthedescent.Oncethedescentphaseisactive, themanageddescentspeedcannotbemodified.Themanageddescentspeed alsotakesintoaccountanyspeedconstraints,whichmaybemodifiedduringthe descentphase,e.g.thedefaultspeedlimit,whichisnormally250ktbelow FCTM Climb, Cruise And Descent TheselectedAP/FDmodesindescentareOPDES,V/SorlesscommonlyFPA. DuringaselecteddescentwithOPDES,V/SorFPAdisplayedontheFMA, avalueof 1000ft/minisappropriatewheninclose proximitytootheraircraft.TheA/THRmodewillautomaticallyreverttoSPEED FCTM 5.30.3 WhenDESisengagedandspeedismanaged,theAP/FDguidestheaircraft FCTM Climb, Cruise And Descent WiththeAP/FDinNAV,theaircraftwillfollowtheprogrammedSTAR.Ifa deviationfromtheprogrammedSTARisrequired,e.g.ATCvectorsorweather avoidance,selectHDG.IfHDGorTRKisselectedwhileinDESmode,reversion toV/Smodeoccursatcurrentverticalspeed,accompaniedbyatripleclickaural warning.Whenclearedtoaspecificwaypoint,performaDIRTOtoensure FCTM 5.30.1 TheFMGScalculatestheTODpointbackwardsfromaposition1000ftonthe finalapproachwithspeedatVAPP.Ittakesintoaccountanydescentspeedand altitudeconstraintsandassumesmanagedspeedisused.Thefirstsegmentof thedescentwillalwaysbeatidlethrustuntilthefirstaltitudeconstraintis reached.Theidlesegmentassumesasmallamountofthrustaboveidleto providesomeflexibilitytomaintaindescentprofileintheeventthatengine anti-iceisusedorifdescentwindsvaryfromforecast.Subsequentsegmentswill FCTM Climb, Cruise And Descent ThemainobjectiveoftheapproachbriefingisforthePFtoinformthePNFofhis intendedcourseofactionfortheapproach.Additionally,potentialthreatsshould behighlighted,alongwiththestrategiestominimisethesethreats.Thebriefing shouldbepracticalandrelevanttotheactualweatherconditionsexpected.It shouldbegivenatatimeoflowworkloadifpossible,toenablethecrewto concentrateonthecontent.Itisimportantthatanymisunderstandingsare FCTM 5.20.11 DuetodifferencesintheFMGSandIRSpositionsandsplitIRSoperationnear thepole,theAP/FDwilldisengageifinHDGuponpolarwaypointpassage.It maybere-engagedandwillfunctionnormallyseveralmilesafterpassingthe polarwaypoint.LossofbothGPSunitsresultsinanincreasedEstimated PositionError(EPE)andpossibledisplayofthe"NAVACCURDOWNGRAD" message,butwouldnotnormallypreventpolaroperations.Lossofoneortwo IRsdoesnotsignificantlyaffectnavigationaccuracy.However,operationwith TruebearingVORsarenotstoredintheFMdatabase.Suchnavigationaids andupdatetheFMGSforthedescentandarrival.DuringFMGSprogramming thePFwillbeheaddown,soitisimportantthatthePNFdoesnotbecome involvedinanytasksthatpreclude theaircraft.Thefuel predictionswillbeaccurateiftheF-PLNiscorrectlyenteredintermsofarrival, missedapproachandalternaterouteing.OncetheFMGShasbeen programmed,thePNFshouldcrosschecktheinformationpriortotheapproach WiththedescentwindsenteredandtheF-PLNarrivalproperly validated,theFMGScancomputeanaccurateTODposition.Pilotsshould crosschecktheFMGSTODpositionagainsttheirownindependentlycalculated TOD point, based where possible on a DME distance from a navaid. OutportstationsshouldbecontactedviaACARSpreferablyorVHFtoadviseof significantchanges tothearrival ,ATAdefectcodes, ordefectswhich couldaffectthenormaltaxiinandshutdownprocedures,ordispatchonthenext FCTM Climb, Cruise And Descent Duringthepre-flightplanningstage,operationsthroughextremelycoldair massesoratextremelatitudesshouldbetakenintoconsideration.CertainMEL itemsmayprecludeoperationsatsuchlatitudes.Someroutesmayrequiremore restrictivenavigationalcapabilityorredundancysuchasMNPS,RNPorRVSM procedures.Considerationshouldalsobegiventoengineout,decompression Above82N,SATCOMisunavailable.HFfrequenciesandHFSELCALmustbe arrangedpriortotheendofSATCOMcoverage.Routinecompany communicationsproceduresshouldinclude"flightfollowing"toenableimmediate assistanceduringadiversionorotheremergency.Abnormalsolarwindsmay affectHFcommunications.Duringperiodsofhighcosmicorsunspotactivityit FCTM 5.20.9 Atleastonceeverhour,whenpassingoverawaypoint,performthefollowing EnterECAMFOBintheGAUGE/TOTALISERcolumn,ontheCFP SubtracttheF.USEDfromtheBEFORESTARTfueltoobtaintheFuel EnterthelesserofFOBandFuelRemainingintheACTUALFUEL FromtheACTUALFUELsubtracttheFRXCONTXMANDandenterthe resultin the ‘CONT / MAND / EXTRA’ column for the waypoint. ComparethisresultagainsttheCFPplannedcontingencyfuelinthe Extendedcruiseoperationsincreasethepotentialforfueltemperaturestoreach thefreezepoint.Fuelfreezereferstotheformationofwaxcrystalssuspendedin thefuel,whichcanaccumulatewhenfueltemperatureisbelowthefreezepoint. Duringnormaloperations,fueltemperaturerarelydecreasestothepointthatit becomeslimiting.FueltemperaturewillslowlyreducetowardsTAT.Iffuel temperatureapproachestheminimumallowed,attempttoachieveahigherTAT bydescendingordivertingtoawarmerairmass,orincreasingMachnumber. Whenflyingabovethetropopause,TATmayonlyincreaseifdescentismadeto alevelbelowthetropopause.Inthiscase,considerclimbingtoincreaseTAT. Belowthetropopause,ifadescentisrequired,theCFPstepbelowaltitude usuallyresultsinsufficientincreaseinTAT.A4000ftdescentwillnormallygive a7°CincreaseinTAT.Anincreaseof0.01MachwillincreaseTAT approximately0.7°C.Uptoonehourmayberequiredforthefueltemperatureto stabilise. Inadditiontotheadverseweatherphenomenaencounteredintheclimb,a furtherconsiderationinthecruiseisCAT.CATcanbeanticipatedbyreference FCTM Climb, Cruise And Descent Theflightplanfuelburnfromdeparturetodestinationisbasedoncertain assumedconditions.Theseincludegrossweight,cruisealtitude,plannedroute, temperature,cruisewindandcruisespeed.Actualfuelconsumptionshouldbe Manyfactorsinfluencefuelconsumptionsuchasactualflightlevel,cruisespeed, BoththeECAMFOBandthe FCTM 5.20.7 Theselectedcruisealtitudeshouldnormallybeasclosetooptimumaspossible. As deviation from optimum cruise altitude increases, economy decreases. Thefollowingdiagramshowsanapproximationofthefuelpenaltiesforflyingat cruiselevelsotherthanoptimum.Notethatthesefiguresonlyreflectfuel penaltiesasopposedtooveralltripcost.Forexample,flyingatahigherlevel FCTM Climb, Cruise And Descent Sincetheoptimumaltitudeincreasesasfuelisconsumedduringtheflight,from acostpointofview,itispreferabletoclimbtoahighercruisealtitudeeveryfew hours.Thistechnique,referredtoasaStepClimb,istypicallyaccomplishedby initiallyclimbingapproximately2000ftabovetheoptimumaltitudeandthen cruisingatthatflightleveluntilapproximately2000ftbelowthenewoptimum lowaltitudeandhighfuelconsumptionconditionforalongperiodoftime.The requested/clearedcruisealtitudeshouldbecomparedtotheRECMAXaltitude. FCTM 5.20.5 Whenapproachingeachwaypoint,visuallychecktrackanddistancetothenext waypointontheF-PLNpageagainstCFPorenroutechart.Itisnotnecessaryto OnaircraftequippedwithGPS,anavigationaccuracycheckisnotrequiredas WithoutGPSPRIMARY,navigationaccuracyshouldbemonitored,particularly FCTM Climb, Cruise And Descent Cruise Selected FCTM 5.20.3 With"ALTCRZ"annunciatedontheFMA,theA/THRengagesin"soft"mode, FCTM Climb, Cruise And Descent TheDATASTOREDROUTESfunctionintheMCDUcanbeusedtostoreup tofivepossiblediversionroutes.TheseroutescanbeenteredintotheSEC F-PLNusingtheSECINITprompt.ThispromptwillonlybeavailableiftheSEC minimumfuelconsumption whereasCI999correspondsto umflighttime Fromapracticalpointofview,CI0equatestomaximum range.TheCIshouldbeconsideredasameansoflong-termspeed managementratherthanameansofshort-termspeedcontrol.Forexample,ifa speedreductionisrequiredfortheentireflighttocomplywithcurfew requirements,thenitwouldbeappropriatetoreducetheCI. CIforLRCare TheSECF-PLNcanbeusedtocheckthepredictionsassociatedwithanewCI. However,beawarethatanymodificationoftheCIintheprimaryF-PLNwill FCTM 5.20.1 Oncethecruiseflightlevelisreached,“ALTCRZ”isdisplayedontheFMA,and FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 5.10.5 AreasofknownturbulenceassociatedwithCBsshouldbeavoided.Goodradar tiltmanagementisessentialtoaccuratelyevaluatetheverticaldevelopmentof CBs.NormallythegainshouldbeleftinAUTO.However,selectiveuseof manualgainmayhelpintheassessmentoftheoverallweathersituation.Manual gainisparticularlyusefulwhenoperatinginheavyrainiftheradarpicturehas becomesaturated.Inthisinstance,reducedgainwillhelpthecrewidentifythe Theflightcontrollawisdesignedtocopewithturbulence.Ifflyingmanually, avoidthetemptationtoover-controlonthesidestickinanattempttoovercome FCTM Reverse side blank Climb, Cruise And Descent Therecommendedmaximumflightleveliscomputedasafunctionofpresent FCTM 5.10.3 Themanagedclimbspeed,computedbytheFMGS,providesthemost economicalclimbprofileasittakesintoaccountweight,actualandpredicted winds,ISAdeviationandCostIndex(CI).Themanagedclimbspeedalsotakes intoaccountanyspeedconstraints,e.g.thedefaultspeedlimit,whichisnormally 250ktupto10000ft.Atheavyweights,GreenDotcanbegreaterthan250kt.In thiscase,theaircraftacceleratestoGreenDoteventhoughthemagentaspeed FCTM Climb, Cruise And Descent WiththeAP/FDinNAV,theaircraftwillfollowtheprogrammedSID.Ifa deviationfromtheprogrammedSIDisrequired,e.g.ATCvectorsorweather avoidance,selectHDG.IfHDGisselected,theclimbmoderevertstoOPCLB. Whenclearedtoaspecificwaypoint,performaDIRTOtoensurecorrect The AP/FD climb modes may be either ThemanagedAP/FDmodeinclimbisCLB.Itsuseisrecommendedaslongas theaircraftisclearedalongtheF-PLN.AlthoughCLBmodewilltrytoobserve avalueof 1000ft/minis appropriatewhenincloseproximitytootheraircraft.TheA/THRmodewill FCTM 5.10.1 Forthepurposeofthismanual,theclimbphaseisconsideredtobefromtheend (A343:FL250) FL340).Climbperformanceisreducedwhenusingderatedclimbthrustbutthe ceilingisnotaffected.TheuseofD1isencouragedatalltimesandtheuseof D2wheneveroperationallyfeasible.Thelevelofderatemaybemodifiedor FCTM Climb, Cruise And Descent TOD Computation.........................................................................................5.30.1 Lateral Navigation.........................................................................................5.30.2 Vertical Navigation........................................................................................5.30.2 Speed Considerations...................................................................................5.30.5 Descent Monitoring.......................................................................................5.30.5 Descent Adjustment......................................................................................5.30.6 Descent Constraints......................................................................................5.30.6 Arrival Operating Speeds..............................................................................5.30.6 Adverse Weather...........................................................................................5.30.6 FCTM 5.00.1 Preface..........................................................................................................5.10.1 Climb Thrust..................................................................................................5.10.1 Lateral Navigation.........................................................................................5.10.2 Vertical Navigation........................................................................................5.10.2 Speed Considerations...................................................................................5.10.3 Altitude Considerations.................................................................................5.10.3 Adverse Weather...........................................................................................5.10.4 Preface..........................................................................................................5.20.1 FMS Use.......................................................................................................5.20.1 Cost Index.....................................................................................................5.20.2 Speed Considerations...................................................................................5.20.3 Altitude Considerations.................................................................................5.20.4 Lateral Navigation.........................................................................................5.20.5 Vertical Navigation........................................................................................5.20.6 Fuel...............................................................................................................5.20.8 Adverse Weather...........................................................................................5.20.9 Polar Operations.........................................................................................5.20.10 Descent Preparation....................................................................................5.20.11 Approach Briefing........................................................................................5.20.12 FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 4.20.7 Iftheaircraftisrequiredtolevel-offbelowtheaccelerationaltitude,ALT* engagesandSRSdisengages.The"LVRCLB"messageflashesontheFMA FCTM Reverse side blank Take-off And Initial Climb Initial Climb The Alpha Lock Function FCTM 4.20.5 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) FCTM Take-off And Initial Climb Obstacleclearance,noiseabatement,ordepartureproceduresmayrequirean immediateturnaftertake-off.ProvidedFDcommandsarefollowedaccurately, :215kt) (A346:233kt) ,whichisdisplayed onthePFDspeedtapeasaredandblackstripinaccordancewithflaplever :200 (A346:215kt) .VMAXdisplayedonthePFDchangesfromVMAXCONF1+F toVMAXCONF1.AstheaircraftacceleratesaboveSspeed,theflaplevercan :200kt) FCTM 4.20.3 Ifthetake-offconfigurationwasCONF2or3,thenFwillbedisplayedonthe PFDspeedtape.OnceaboveFspeedandaccelerating(itisnotnecessarythat FCTM Take-off And Initial Climb Atthethrustreductionaltitude,"LVRCLB"flashesontheFMA.FollowtheFD FCTM 4.20.1 Forthepurposeofthismanual,initialclimbisconsideredtobefromthetake-off FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 4.10.11 Onreceiptofapredictive“WINDSHEARAHEAD”warning,applythechecklist actionsfrommemory.Ifthewarningoccursbefore100kt,stop.Ifthewarning occursonceairborne,selectTOGAandfollowtheSRS.Continuethedeparture andcleanupasnormalunlesswindshearisencounteredora“WINDSHEAR” SelectionoftheTERRONNDpbwillinhibitthedisplayoftheWINDSHEAR Fortake-offinstrong,variablecrosswindsand/orgustyconditionstheuseof FCTM Take-off And Initial Climb Awarenessoftheweatherconditionswhichresultinwindshearwillreducethe FCTM 4.10.9 Adverseweatherthatcanbeencounteredduringthetake-offandintialclimb Whenicingconditionsexistat0 Candbelow,thetake-offmustbeprecededby anenginestaticrun-upto50%N1orgreaterandstableengineoperation checkedbeforethestartofthetake-offrun.FCOM3refers.Iftheaircrafthas beeneitherde-icedoranti-iced,apretake-offinspectionofthewingupper surfacesmustbecarriedoutjustpriortotake-offforevidenceofice,snowor FCTM Take-off And Initial Climb AsopposedtoaFLEXtake-off,theselectionofTOGAfollowinganengine failureduringaderatedthrusttake-offisprohibitedaslongasspeedremains FCTM 4.10.7 Areductionintake-offthrustleadstolowerVMCG/VMCAandhence,alower V1.WhentakingofffromshortorcontaminatedrunwayswhereASDAisthe limitingfactor,areductionintheminimumcontrolspeedsmaygeneratea (A346:8) deratedlevelsaredefined,( :D04,D08,D12,D16,D20, (A346:D28,D32) ,eachcorrespondingtoaspecificpercentagereduction fromthemaximumtake-offthrust.Deratedproceduresshouldonlybeusedona runwaywheretheweightislimitedbyVMCG.Deratingthethrusttoalevelbelow FCTM Take-off And Initial Climb PitchLimitIndicator(PLI)onthePFD.Thisindicatesthepitchlimitswhen Modificationtotherotationlawtoaccountforthecharacteristicsofthe TheFLEXtake-offreducesEGTthusincreasingenginelifeandreliabilitywhile reducingmaintenanceandoperatingcosts.TheFLEXtake-offcanbeused whentheactualtake-offweightislowerthanthemaximumpermissibletake-off weightfortheactualtemperature.AstheMTOWdecreaseswithincreasing temperature,itispossibletoassumeatemperatureatwhichtheactualtake-off weightwouldbecomelimiting.ThisassumedtemperatureiscalledtheFLEX TheminimumcontrolspeedsassociatedwiththeFLEXtake-offarerelatedto VMCG/VMCAatTOGAthrust.Therefore,shouldtheaircraftsufferanengine failureatV1,thereisnolimitationonselectingTOGAthrustontheremaining FCTM 4.10.5 Toaiddirectionalcontrolincrosswindsgreaterthan20kt,orwithatailwind, applyfullforwardsidestickatthestartofthetake-offrolluntil80kt.Atthispoint Aninappropriatetake-offtechniquecouldresultinatailstrike.Factorsthatmight Increasedaftsidestickinputatalatestageintherotation ;i.e.aboveabout 8°pitchattitude,whentheaircraftisnearthepointoflift-offandtail Usingthetake-offtechniquedescribedearlierwillminimisetheriskoftailstrike. FCTM Take-off And Initial Climb Take-off FCTM 4.10.3 WithbothenginesoperativetheA333hasconsiderableexcessthrust,evenat maximumflextemperatures.Itisnormalforacorrectlyflownrotationtoresultin astabilisedspeedinexcessofV2+10kt.Therotationrateshouldnotbe increasedinanefforttocontainthespeedincrease.Withbothengines operative,theperformanceoftheaircraftisnotcompromisedbythisadditional Atheavyweights,theaircrafthasmuchgreaterinertiaandisthereforeslowerto commencerotation.Astheaircraftstartstorotate,maintainback-pressureto FCTM Take-off And Initial Climb AtVR,promptlyandsmoothlyapplyandholdapproximately2/3aftsidestickto achievearotationrateofapproximately2to3°/sec,assessedprimarilyby outsidevisualreference.Avoidrapidandlargecorrectionsthatwillresultina sharpreactioninpitchfromtheaircraft.Therotationratemaytaketimeto establishbutforagivenstickinput,onceithasdevelopeditremainsrelatively constant.Iftheestablishedpitchrateisnotsatisfactory,makeasmooth correctiononthesidestick,howeveravoidfurtheraftsidestickinputsnearthe pointofliftoff. Therotationrateisimportantastoolowaratewouldcompromise take-offperformance,whereastoohigharatewouldincreasetheriskof tailstrike.Itisalsoimportanttobewellpreparedforanenginefailurecaseand thereforeitisappropriatetohabituallyrotateataratethatwouldcaterforthe enginefailurecase,i.e.about2.5°sec.Astherotationprogressesandthe runwayenvironmentdisappearsfromview,transferattentiontothePFDto establishtheinitialpitchattitude.TheFDpitchbarisnottobeusedasaninitial A33315 A34312.5 A34615 FCTM 4.10.1 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) (A333:1.15EPR) (A343:50%N1) (A346:1.05EPR) ina rapidandcontinuousmovementbyreferencetotheTLAindicatoronthe ModifiedEngineAccelerationScheduleforTake-Off(MEASTO)isinstalledon theA333engines.Thislogicautomaticallycontrolsengineaccelerationby preventinghighN1atlowspeedduringthetake-offrolltoavoidfanstall.Asa consequence,take-offthrusttakeslongertoreachthanonotherengines (approximately 10 seconds more) and is achieved around 60 kt IAS. The“ONEHUNDREDKNOTS”callbythePNFrequiresthePFtocrosscheck speedonhisPFDandrespond“CHECK”.Thisresponsealsoservesasan incapacitationcheck.“V1"isanAutoCallOut;iftheauto-callfails,thePNFcalls ”V1".AtV1,theCaptainremoveshishandfromthethrustlevers.ThePNFcalls FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 4.00.1 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) TABLE OF CONTENTS FCTM Reverse side blank Pre-Start, Start And Taxi Themajoradverseweatherfactorsaffectingtaxiingtechniquesarepoorvisibility andcontaminatedtaxiways.Inbothinstances,thetaxispeedshouldbelimited to10ktandanyactionwhichmightdivertthefullattentionofthecrewfrom taxiingshouldbedelayeduntiltheaircraftisstopped.TheBeforeTake-off checklistshouldbeperformedeitherbeforetaxiorwhenreachingtheholding Onacontaminatedtaxiwaythereareanumberofadditionalfactorsthatshould Avoidlargesteeringhandwheelinputstominimisetheriskofskidding Onslipperytaxiways,itmightbenecessarytousedifferentialbraking Onslushorsnowcoveredtaxiways,delayflapselectionuntilreachingthe Whenholdingonthegroundinicingconditionsforextendedperiodsoftimeorif enginevibrationisencountered,thrustshouldbeincreasedperiodicallyandjust FCTM 3.30.7 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) LATE CHANGE OF RUNWAY AND/OR TAKE-OFF DATA Atairportswheretheopportunityforalaterunwaychangecouldbeexpected, suchasBKK,obtainACARSRTOWforbothrunwayspriortopushback. Providedperformanceisnotlimiting,inputthesameflapconfigurationforthe secondaryrunwayasthatgeneratedbytheACARST/Odataprintoutforthe primaryrunway.Selectionofthesameflapconfigurationwillreducethechance Anymodificationtodatashallbeinsertedandcrosscheckedfollowingthesame processdefinedinNormalProcedures.Iftake-offdatahaschanged,orinthe ObtainnewACARSRTOW.AgaintheCaptainshallchecktheACARS ModifytheF-PLNtoreflectthenewATCclearancefortherunway,SID InsertthenewPERFTOdata;theMCDUmaynotcleartheoriginalPERF datawhentherunwayischanged.CheckPERFCLBdata(speed UsingtheEFISControlPanel,confirmselectionofEFISdisplayforboth Thisbriefingshouldnormallybeabriefconfirmationofthethoroughtake-off briefingmadeattheparkingbay.Anymajorchangesthatmayhaveoccurred FCTM Pre-Start, Start And Taxi Taxiontherighthandsideoftherunwayandturnlefttoestablisha20 divergencefromtherunwayaxis(usingtheNDorPFD)withamaximum Whenphysicallyovertherunwayedge,smoothlyinitiateafulldeflection FCTM 3.30.5 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) TheTaxiAidCameraSystem(TACS)canbeusefulinobservingareasbeneath OnlongstraighttaxiwaysandwithnoATCorothergroundtrafficconstraints, allowtheaircrafttoacceleratetowards30ktandthenuseonesmoothbrake applicationtodeceleratetowards15kt.Donot"ride"thebrakes.TheNDground CarbonBrakewearisafunctionofthenumberofbrakeapplicationsandbrake temperature.Thewearisnotafunctionofthepressureappliedorthedurationof thebraking.Theonlywaytominimisebrakewearistoreducethenumberof TheFCOMlimitsbraketemperatureto300 Cbeforecommencementoftake-off. Thislimitensuresthatanyhydraulicfluidwhichmightcomeintocontactwiththe FCTM Pre-Start, Start And Taxi Taxi FCTM 3.30.3 Thenosewheelsteeringsystemis"fly-by-wire"withnomechanicalconnection :30m) (A346:35m) Forturnsof90 ormore,speedshouldbebelow10kt.Smoothlyinitiatetheturn astheintersectingtaxiwaycentreline(orintendedexitpoint)approachesthe FCTM Pre-Start, Start And Taxi Ataconvenientstage,priortoorduringtaxi,butbeforearmingtheautobrake, thePFannounces"FlightControlCheck"andappliesfulllongitudinalandlateral sidestickdeflection.OntheF/CTLpage,thePNFchecksandcallsfulldeflection andcorrectsenseofmovementofelevatorsandaileronsandcorrectextension FCTM 3.30.1 Groundcrew"thumbsup"signalhasbeenreceivedindicatingall (A346:Ifthebrakepedalsarepressedbeforereleasingtheparkbrake,the alternatebrakingmoderemainsactiveandthebraketripleindicatorwillcontinue todisplaybluesystempressure.Whenthebrakepedalsarereleased,normal brakingmoderesumesandthebraketripleindicatorshouldthenreadnear Tobegintaxi,releasethebrakesand,ifrequired,smoothlyincreasethrusttothe minimumrequiredfortheaircrafttorollforward.Ifthrustaboveidleisrequiredto achievetaxispeed,beawarethatenginesareslowtoacceleratefromground idleandallowtimeforaircraftresponsebeforeincreasingthrustfurther.Engine noiselevelintheflightdeckislowandnotindicativeofenginethrust.Excessive thrustapplicationmayresultinexhaustblastdamageorforeignobjectingestion FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 3.20.1 Thethrustleversmustbeconfirmedatidlepriortoenginestart.Ifthethrust leversarenotatidle,thethrustwillincreaseaboveidleafterstart,creatinga potentiallyhazardoussituation.However,anECAMcautionENGSTARTFAULT ). FCTM Reverse side blank INTENTIONALLY BLANK 3.10.3 Duringthispotentiallyhazardousphaseoftheoperation,theNPsshouldbe strictlyfollowedtominimisethepossibilityofinjurytogroundpersonnelor damagetotheaircraft/groundequipment.Consequently,ATCclearanceshould OncethedoorsareclosedandATCclearancehasbeenobtained,theSTART FCTM Reverse side blank Pre-Start, Start And Taxi Pre-start FCTM 3.10.1 Asinallaircraft,achievingthecorrectseatingpositionisveryimportant.The correctseatingpositionnotonlyallowsthepilottohavethebestpossibleviewof theinstrumentsandoutsidethecockpit,butalsoensuresthathecanoperateall controlsinbothnormalandnon-normalsituations.ItiscriticalduringLow VisibilityProcedures(LVP)thatthepilot'seyesarepositionedcorrectlysothat hemaximisesthevisualsegment,thusincreasingthepossibilityofachievingthe Toachievecorrecteyeposition,theaircraftisfittedwithanindicatorlocatedon thecentrewindscreenpost.Itcomprisestwoballswhich,whensuperimposed oneontheother,indicatethatthepilot'seyesareinthecorrectposition.Adjust theseathorizontally,verticallyandinreclinetoensurecorrecteyeposition.The adjustmentstotheseatshouldbemadewhensittinginanormalposture.A commonerrorissittingtoolowwhichdecreasesthecockpitcut-offangle, Afterseatadjustment,theoutboardarmrestshouldbeadjustedsuchthatthe forearmrestsonitcomfortablywhenholdingthesidestick.Thereshouldbeno FCTM INTENTIONALLY BLANK 3.00.1 Seating Position............................................................................................3.10.1 A346 Taxi Camera........................................................................................3.30.5 Taxi Speed And Braking................................................................................3.30.5 Carbon Brakes..............................................................................................3.30.5 Brake Temperature.......................................................................................3.30.5 Turn On The Runway...........................................................................3.30.6 Late Change Of Runway And/Or Take-off Data............................................3.30.7 Take-off Briefing Confirmation.......................................................................3.30.7 Adverse Weather...........................................................................................3.30.8 Taxi With Engines Shut Down.......................................................................3.30.8 Line-up Technique.........................................................................................3.30.8 FCTM Reverse side blank General Information Thepilotmusttakecarewhenperformingago-aroundwiththeFPVselected,as onsomeaircrafttheHDG-V/SFDisnotautomaticallydisplayeduponthe selectionofTOGA.Inthiscase,itisimportanttousepitchattitudeasthe FCTM 2.80.3 TheFPVisparticularlyusefulonnon-precisionapproachesasthepilotcan selectvaluesfortheinboundtrackandfinaldescentpathangleontheFCU. Onceestablishedinbound,onlyminorcorrectionsshouldberequiredtomaintain anaccurateapproachpath.Trackinganddescentflightpathcanbemonitored byreferencetothetrackindicatorandthebird.Beaware,however,thatthebird onlyindicatesatrajectoryandnotguidancetoagroundbasedfacility.For TheFPVisusefulasacross-referencewhenflyingvisualcircuits.Onthe downwindleg,putthewingsofthebirdonthehorizontomaintainlevelflight. FCTM General Information TheFPVdisplaysinformationontheaircrafttrajectoryrelativetotheground. FCTM 2.80.1 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) GENERAL TheFPVindicatesperformanceanddoesnotdirectorcommand.Itdisplays informationontheaircrafttrajectoryrelativetotheground.Becauseofinertia, TheverticalflightpathanglecanbereaddirectlyfromthePFDpitchscale.Ifthe aircraftisstableandthewingsofthebirdareonthePFDhorizon,thenthe ThetrackisdisplayedonthePFDasagreendiamondindicatoronthecompass, aswellasbythelateraldisplacementofthebirdfromthefixedaircraftsymbol. OntheND,thetrackisdisplayedasagreendiamondindicatoronthecompass FCTM General Information Thrust Control DISCONNECTION · Depressing the instinctive disconnect pb · A/THROFF"cautionwillbeannunciatedontheE/WDon thefirstpressoftheinstinctivedisconnectpbandwillbeclearedbya secondpressofthepb.Thecautionwillalsodisappearaftera9sec A/THROFF"and"ENG LOCKED"willappearontheECAMandthemessage"THRLK"willflashin amberontheFMA.Inthisinstance,promptlyaligntheTLAbluecircletothe TheA/THRcanbereactivatedbypressingtheA/THRpbontheFCUand EvenwithA/THRselectedoff,highangleofattackprotection(AlphaFloor)is providedbytheA/THR.AlphaFloorisnotavailableinthecertaincases.FCOM FCTM 2.70.7 REV 1 (6 JUN 05) All Engines Operative A/THRLIMITED"appearsontheE/WDandthemessage "LVRCLB"flashesinwhiteontheFMA.Thissituationisbroughttothecrew's attentionasacaution,withasinglechimerepeatedevery5secsuntilthethrust A/THRLIMITED"appearsonthe FCTM General Information Thereareanumberofwarnings,cautionsandmessagesassociatedwiththe operationoftheA/THR.Thewarnings,cautionsandmessagescanbeclassified FCTM 2.70.5 Toinitiatetake-off,theCaptainadvancesthethrustleverstoeithertheFLX/MCT FCTM General Information Thrust Control Thrust Lever Quadrant FCTM 2.70.3 Whenarmed,theA/THRisreadytocontrolthethrustoncethethrustleversare movedintotheactiverange.NormallytheA/THRisarmedontheapplicationof take-offthrust,atwhichpoint"A/THR"isdisplayedinblueintherighthand columnoftheFMA.Aftertake-off,A/THRisactivatedbyselectingthethrust FCTM General Information OneoftheuniquefeaturesoftheAirbusA/THRsystemisthatthethrustlevers arenotback-driven,i.e.theydonotmoveasthethrustchanges.Thisbeingthe case,othercuesmustbeusedtomonitorA/THRperformance,e.g.thespeed trendvectoronthePFDorthetransientandcommandedN1/EPRindicationson theengineinstruments.TheA/THRnormallyremainsactivefromthethrust SpeedorMachmode,wheretheA/THRmodulatesthrusttoachievea FCTM 2.70.1 Consolemountedleversareusedtocontrolenginethrust.Thrustcanbe controlledeithermanually,orautomaticallythroughtheA/THR.Eachleversends electricalsignalstotheFADECoftheengineitcontrols.TheFADECresponds FCTM General Information Iftheaircraftisfaroutsidethenormalflightenvelopeandreachessome abnormalattitudes,theflightcontrollawismodifiedtoallowthecrewtoregain normalattitudeefficiently.Thisistheabnormalattitudelaw.FCOM1.27.30 TheA346,beinglongerthantheA333andA343,hasahigherriskoftailstrike. Consequently,severalnewfeatureshavebeenincorporated.Theseincludean addedrotationlawplusanadditionalauto-callout,PFDindicationandECAM Apitchrotationlawhasbeenaddedfortake-offandisengagedduringthe rotationphase.Apitchdemanddependingonpitchrateandsidestickpositionis FCTM 2.60.11 Inmostcasesoftriplefailure,e.g.tripleADRfailure,directlawistriggered. Thehandlingcharacteristicsaresimilartoaconventionalaircraft. Anytendency torollstickfreecanbecorrectedbyconventionaluseoftherudder.Ruddertrim canbeusedintheconventionalway,butnotethatthesideslipindexmaybe slightlydisplacedfromthecentreoncetherudderforceshavebeentrimmedout. Rapidspeedbrakeapplicationand largethrustchangeswillresultinsignificant pitchingmoments,i.e.nose-upwiththrustincreaseandnosedownwiththrust Inpitch,elevatordeflectionisproportionaltosidestickdeflection.Itisimportant tonotethatthecontrolsareverypowerful.Consequently,usesmallinputswhen athighspeed.Asthereisnoauto-trim,usemanualtrimmakingsmallinputson Inroll,aileronandspoilerdeflectionisproportionaltosidestickdeflection. law works with the yaw damper to provide a minimal turn coordination. Noprotectionsareavailablebutoverspeedandstallauralwarningsremain Thepurposeofthebackupsystemistoallowcontroloftheaircraftfollowinga totallossofelectrics,flightcontrolcomputers,elevators,oraileronsandspoilers. Itisdesignedtoallowthecrewtosafelystabilisetheflightpathwhileattempting torecoveracontrollaworrestorealostsystem(s).Itisnotintendedthatan Stabilisetheaircraftflightpathusingtherudderandmanualpitchtrimwhile attemptingtorecoveraflightcontrollaw.Thrustconsiderationsregarding Pitchcontrolisachievedthroughthepitchtrimwheel.Makesmallinputsonthe Lateralcontrolisachievedthroughtherudder.Therudderinducesasignificant rollwithaslightdelay.Makesmallinputsontherudderpedalsandwaitforthe aircraftresponsebeforemakingafurthercorrection.Wingslevelstabilisation FCTM General Information Oncommercialaircraft,30°bankangleisnormallynottobeexceeded.Abank angleof67°inlevelflightcorrespondstotheaircraftlimitof2.5g.Therefore,67° hasbeenestablishedasthebankanglelimit.Approachingthislimit,therollrate Insomecasesofdoublefailure,e.g.doublehydraulicfailure,theintegrityand redundancyofthecomputersandotherrequiredsystemsarenotsufficientto achievenormallawwithitsprotections.Inthiscase,AlternateLawistriggered. VLSremains,but áprotandámaxdisappear,replacedbyasingleblackand redstrip,thetopofwhichisthestallwarningspeedVSW.UnlikeVLSwhichis stable,VSW isgsensitivesoastoindicatemarginabovestallduringturns.The autopilotmaybeavailabledependingonthecauseandtypeoffailure(s).During landing, alternate law reverts to direct law at100 ft RA. Iftheaircraftisoperatedoutsidethenormalflightenvelope,thepilotmusttake appropriatecorrectiveactiontoavoidlosingcontroland/ortoavoidhighspeed Inroll,dependingonthefailurelevel,controliseithernormal(ALTN1)ordirect (ALTN2).Inrolldirect,theaircraftappearstobeverysensitiveandbankstability Thebankangleprotectionismaintainedifrollisnormal(ALTN1)butlost FCTM 2.60.9 Whenhighspeedprotectionistriggered,theautopilotdisconnects,thepitchtrim isfrozen,thespiralstaticstabilityisreducedfrom33°to0°ofbankandthelimit bankangleisreducedfrom67°to45°.Ifhighspeedprotectionisactivewiththe aircraftestablishedinaturn,whenthesidestickisreleasedtheaircraftwillroll FCTM General Information Flight Controls CIFT Escape Manoeuvres on Protected and Non-Protected Aircraft High Pitch Attitude Protection FCTM